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Abstract 
The most important questions in the study of class voting during the last few decades have 
been whether, to what degree, and why class voting has been declining. Usually, a 
dichotomous left-right party choice variable has been utilized. This may have distorted de-
alignment and realignment, as the rise of the New Left and the New Right has changed the 
relationship between the social classes and the political parties. In this thesis, we utilize a 
party family dependent variable on contemporary data instead. We first describe the class 
basis in 18 West-European countries for all the party families, showing that the party families 
normally grouped into the “Left” and “Right” categories indeed have quite different class 
bases. The strength of class voting also varies by party family. We then test one of the 
mechanisms connecting class to voting, namely the role of value orientations. This means that 
we see how much of the bivariate association between class and voting that disappears when 
controlling for these intermediate variables. What we find is compelling evidence of the need 
for a more nuanced party choice variable: The amount of class voting accounted for by the 
value orientations varies between the party families. The thesis thus i) describes the class 
basis of the West-European party families; ii) tests a mechanism through which class has its 
effects on voting; iii) proves the need for a more nuanced, “4th generation” dependent 
variable. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Class has always been an essential component of political analysis. Karl Marx and Max 
Weber made the concept central to the social sciences, and since Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) 
seminal work on cleavages it has also been central in political science and the study of the 
evolution of party systems.  
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized two cleavages connected to social class. The first is the 
conflict between labour and capital, workers and owners. This conflict led to a certain 
convergence between Western European party systems, as all countries developed parties 
representing the workers. However, after the Russian Revolution, not all of these were Social 
Democratic anymore. Neither did the conflict lead to convergence in the representation of the 
owners’ interests, which were represented by a number of different types of parties. The 
second cleavage connected to class is the conflict between producers and consumers of 
agrarian products. This cleavage has often been integrated into existing parties, although in 
the Nordic countries it contributed to the development of a new party family – namely, the 
Agrarian parties (see also Knutsen 2006: xi-xii). 
However, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) never provided a clear-cut definition of a cleavage. We 
will thus rely on Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995), who provide a three-part definition of 
cleavage. First, a cleavage is based on long-lasting social divisions that create “objectively” 
identifiable groups within a society – like classes, religious denominations, and so on. Second, 
the members of these groups share a common way of life, giving rise to shared value 
orientations within the groups. Finally, a cleavage needs to be organizationally 
institutionalized, for instance in a political party or a church (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 
494). 
Since the 1950s and 1960s, the class cleavage has been a central explanation for voting 
patterns in Western Europe. For some, such as Lipset et al. (1954) or Downs (1957), this is 
simply because people belonging to a certain class have common economic interests, and they 
vote in line with their material class interests. Those with few resources are in favour of 
redistribution because they want more, and those with many resources are against it because 
they do not want to share. But if that were all there was to it, we might as well use income 
instead of class as the independent variable. Since many within a class do not vote according 
to their economic class interests, something else must also be at stake. This could be the 
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common experiences and social networks members of a class often share. It could also be 
because class membership affects other aspects of our lives, such as our values or political 
attitudes, and thus indirectly explains our voting (Manza et al. 1995: 140). As mentioned, this 
is incorporated into the very definition of cleavage given by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995). 
It is the last idea that will be tested in chapter 4 in this thesis, when we will see how much of 
the effect of class on voting that is indirect through value orientations. 
1.1 The Study of Class Voting: A Brief History 
On the basis of the research problems, the hypotheses, the measurement procedures, and the 
employed methods, Nieuwbeerta (1995) categorized the literature on class voting into three 
“generations”.  
The first generation of class voting research was conducted during the 1950s and 1960s. The 
scholars involved studied whether or not there was a relationship between class and voting 
through the use of cross-tabulations. These were usually based on a dichotomous measure of 
class (manual/non-manual) and a dichotomous measure of political parties (left-wing/right-
wing). The so-called Alford index (Alford 1962) was the dominant measure of class voting 
(Jansen 2011: 22; Knutsen 2007). This is simply the percentage difference between manual 
and non-manual occupations in left-wing voting (Alford 1964: 79-80). 
The second generation, which was born in the late 1960s, improved research in several ways. 
The class schemas were more nuanced than the manual/non-manual divide and linear 
regression replaced cross-tabulations as the most common method of analysis. Prominent 
contributions to this generation were Franklin et al. (1992) and Inglehart (1977; 1990). The 
goal was to increase the explained voting variance by including more variables, notably value 
orientations (Jansen 2011: 23; Knutsen 2007: 458). The first two generations came to a few 
broad conclusions: In all Western democracies, members of the manual class were more 
likely to vote left-wing than members of the non-manual class. Also, the strength of class 
voting varied significantly between countries, and had declined in most countries in the post-
war period (Nieuwbeerta 1996: 346). Class voting was most important in Scandinavia and 
Great Britain, where it also decreased the most, and least important in the US and Canada 
(Evans 1999: 5).  
The first two generations also made some attempts at finding explanations for the differences 
in levels of class voting. Some of the explanations considered were income inequality, social 
3 
 
mobility, and the politicization of class issues (Alford 1964), religious and ethnic 
fragmentation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1979), the standard of living (Kerr et al. 
1960), the unionization rate of workers (Korpi 1983), and the rise of New Politics (Inglehart 
1977; 1990). However, the empirical tests were bivariate and usually based on crude measures 
of both class and party choice – e.g. the Alford index (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999: 124). 
In the mid-1980s, the third generation of class voting research came forth, criticizing both the 
measure of class and of class voting. The dichotomous class schema was seen as too crude 
(see also Erikson et al. 1979: 415). According to scholars like Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et 
al. (1993), important changes in the class structure had emerged during the last decades, 
rendering the manual/non-manual divide less relevant. This was both due to the fact that the 
working class was diminishing, and that the middle class was getting larger and more 
heterogeneous (see also Nieuwbeerta 1996: 360-361). Evans (1999: 8-11) also criticized the 
Alford index for obscuring variations within the non-manual and manual classes.  
The class measure was further developed and scholars regularly used internationally 
comparable and standardized class schemas, like the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) 
class schema (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Heath et al. (1985) and 
Thomsen (1987) also criticized the Alford index for being sensitive to the general popularity 
of the parties, and argued that it was necessary to use relative measures (like log odds ratios) 
instead of absolute ones.  
Nieuwbeerta (1995) categorized his own important study as belonging to the third generation. 
In one of the most expansive studies of class voting conducted at the time, he wanted to 
describe both the variations in relative class voting between countries and within countries 
over time in light of the critiques raised by the third generation. He found that the third 
generation scholars had a point: Some of the variation between countries and over time was 
due to the use of the Alford index. However, important variations still remained, and there 
was a clear decline in class voting throughout the period. In addition, the relative and absolute 
measures of class voting did not yield substantially different conclusions (Nieuwbeerta 1996: 
370-371). Nieuwbeerta (1996: 371-372) ends by urging future research to explain the 
differences in class voting and to distinguish between all parties in the party system.  
Hout et al. (1995) introduced the kappa index, which allowed for just that: A more 
differentiated party choice measure (Jansen 2011: 24-25). They also distinguished between 
traditional class voting, i.e. the Alford index, and total class voting, which includes all effects 
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class may have on voting, not only on voting left-wing versus right-wing (Hout et al. 1995: 
806). We will return to the kappa index in section 2.3. 
What explanations were suggested by the third generation for the variations in class voting? 
Nieuwbeerta (1996) argues that social characteristics (such as value orientations or standards 
of living) and political characteristics (such as party polarization) were suggested in some 
very tentative analyses. Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) used multilevel techniques and cross-
level interaction terms to find that ethnic and religious diversity reduced class voting. They 
also found that increased union density was positively associated with class voting between 
countries, but negatively associated with class voting over time within-countries.  
While the third generation improved and discussed the dichotomous class variable and the 
relative versus absolute measures of class voting, they did not (with a few exceptions) pay 
sufficient attention to the problems related to the dichotomous party choice variable. 
1.2 The State of the Art: The 4th Generation 
Knutsen (2007) launches a possible fourth generation. He suggests that the class cleavage cuts 
across the left-right division of parties: the New Left parties are more popular amongst the 
higher educated and the new middle class, whereas the Radical Right is more popular 
amongst the less educated and workers (see also Knutsen 2004: 195). Hence, it is necessary 
with a more detailed party choice variable. This issue has formerly been raised by Evans 
(1999: 12-15), who claims that the dichotomous party choice variable is affected by changes 
in the relative size of the different parties labelled as “left” and “non-left”, and misrepresents 
class-party realignment as dealignment (for instance if manual workers stop voting for the left 
and start voting for the radical right). 
Expanding on Hout et al.’s (1995) distinction between total and traditional class voting, 
Knutsen (2006) categorizes the parties in eight European countries into ten party families and 
analyses total class voting over time. The correlations between party choice and social class 
still show a clear average decline from the 1970s to the 1990s. Total class voting was largest 
in Denmark in the 1970s and 1980s and lowest in Germany, but converged at a low level in 
the 1990s as the countries with the highest total class voting also saw the sharpest decreases 
(Knutsen 2006: 181-183). These findings are in accordance with findings from the third 
generation, especially those of Nieuwbeerta (1995). 
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Knutsen (2007) launches the new approach with a nuanced party choice variable as a possible 
new generation of class voting research. Whereas Knutsen (2007) mainly discusses the 
dependent variable, Jansen (2011: 24-29) claims that there has also been a change in the 
research problems and hypotheses, as well as the measurement procedures and analyses 
strategies. In Jansen’s view, only a few studies have tried to systematically test the 
explanations suggested in the literature, namely Nieuwbeerta (1995, chapter 4), Nieuwbeerta 
and Ultee (1999), and Knutsen (2006). Jansen (2011: 25) argues that the explanations usually 
fit two categories: Sociological and political explanations. The sociological hypotheses, 
regarding the demand-side, include changes in the composition of classes or the values of the 
classes (so-called “bottom up” explanations). The political hypotheses, covering the supply-
side, include party polarization and the class basis of electoral appeals (“top-down” 
explanations). The class measures encompass post-industrial, revised class schemas. The 
techniques used are notably multinomial and conditional logistic regression. 
According to Jansen (2011), the fourth generation is in its early years, and his own analysis is 
one of its contributions. Nevertheless, in the comparative part of his thesis he is still using the 
dichotomous party choice variable (Jansen 2011: ch. 3). In the second part of his analysis, 
covering only the Netherlands, albeit over time, he uses a party choice variable categorizing 
the parties into the old-left, the new-left, the liberal right, and religious parties. Thus only the 
second part may be said to belong to the fourth generation, if we stick to the definition 
suggested by Knutsen (2007). Jansen (2011: 200) himself criticises his pooled analyses for 
their “low level of detail in measuring cleavages and cleavage strength”. But even the analysis 
of the Netherlands could be more detailed in its measure of party choice: The four categories 
are not exhaustive.  
In the fourth generation part of his study, Jansen (2011: ch. 4) finds that social explanations as 
well as political ones are important to explain the decline of class voting in the Netherlands. 
For instance, the differences between classes with respect to economic ideology weakened 
over time – although holding this ideology constant only partly explained the decline in class 
voting in the Netherlands in the period 1971-2006. After controlling for bottom up 
explanations, it turns out that the parties’ economic left-right position does impact class 
voting, whereas their position on the cultural dimension does not (Jansen 2011: 198-199).  
The latest major addition to the class voting literature at the time of writing, Evans and de 
Graaf (2013), advocates a fourth generation approach by arguing that parties need to “diverge 
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on matters of relevance to people in different classes or with differing levels of religiosity for 
there to be class and religious differences in party preferences” (Evans and de Graaf 2013a: 
7). The goal of the book is to test sociological explanations versus political ones, in particular 
whether the positions of parties on class and religious issues affect the level of class and 
religious voting.  
The comparative part of the book is testing these explanations on fifteen Western democracies 
from 1960-2005, although with a dichotomous dependent variable. While some of the decline 
in class voting is explained by changes in party positions and party polarization, important 
declines in class voting remain even after controlling for these two factors. This is in line with 
other third generation findings, as already discussed. Nevertheless, the authors admit that this 
might be due to the collapsed party choice variable, “ignoring the complexity of the ‘new left’ 
and the ‘new right’” (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 392). 
The case studies that follow are usually applying a fourth generation dependent variable. 
These show a more nuanced picture. In only four of the twelve countries studied, namely 
Australia, Britain, France and Spain, do the authors find a clear decline of class voting. In two 
countries, West Germany and Italy, there is a modest decline. There is stability in Canada, 
Denmark and East Germany. In Poland they find alignment, in the US realignment, and in the 
Netherlands decline and then realignment (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 394). It is also 
interesting to note that in the Australian case study, one of the four showing a clear decline, 
the party choice variable was still dichotomous (Marks 2013: 149).  
The authors also attempted to explain the changes or stability in class voting. In most 
countries, the changes were explained by top-down (i.e. political) processes. The lack of 
decline in Canada and Denmark were accounted for by top-down stability. In Australia, the 
decline was accounted for by both political and sociological factors. The decline and 
realignment in the Netherlands, as well as the alignment in Poland, were explained by bottom-
up processes (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 394). 
1.3 The Aim of the Thesis – Filling the Gaps  
This thesis’ aim is to fill certain gaps in the newly formed fourth generation of class voting 
studies. Until now, these studies have mostly been divided into two parts: One comparative, 
large-scale part, followed by one or more case studies (see Jansen 2011; Evans and De Graaf 
2013). Only the case studies have actually measured total class voting by using fourth 
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generation party choice measures. The comparative parts have commonly been using the 
traditional left-right dichotomous party choice variable, measuring what Knutsen (2006) 
labelled “overall left-right class voting” (i.e. detailed class schema but dichotomous party 
choice variable). This is partly due to the fact that these studies are longitudinal, often 
covering most of the post-war period. As Evans and De Graaf (2013a: 12) put it, “[a]lthough 
it would be ideal to have strictly comparable measures for each case, this is not feasible in a 
project that covers so many surveys across such extensive periods of time.” Also, these 
longitudinal studies have tended to focus mainly on whether or not and to what degree class 
voting has been declining within countries over time, without enough emphasis on the 
variation between countries (see also Knutsen 2004: 2). 
This thesis, on the other hand, will measure total class voting in a comparative setting. By 
limiting the cases in time, we avoid several of the problems related to non-comparable cases. 
We also change the focus from the question of decline and change over time to the question of 
how the situation is today. With the possible exception of Knutsen (2006), this will be the first 
full-fledged comparative fourth generation study. Hopefully the end result will cast light upon 
both the need for a more nuanced party choice variable and class voting and its mechanisms 
in Western Europe. Given that most studies even today use a dichotomous left-right 
dependent variable, the findings may have huge implications as to whether or not this practice 
should continue. 
We will further attempt to disentangle the relationship between class and voting by testing 
one of the mechanisms. This means that we will try to say something about why there is an 
association between structure and vote. Thomassen (2005: 6-7) writes that there are three 
main schools of thought in this area. First, the political-psychological approach, which 
emphasizes that party identification, developed early in life, shapes people’s political 
attitudes, perceptions, and political behaviour. The second school is based on Downs’ 
economic theory of democracy. This school claims that ideology, notably the left-right 
dimension, is used to reduce information costs for voters, who assess parties based on 
political issues and government performance. Finally, we have the political-sociological 
approach, represented by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in the European context. They claim that 
the cleavage structure is reflected in differences in value orientations, which again affect 
voting. This is evident in their description of parties as “alliances in conflicts over policies 
and value commitments within the larger body politic” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5, italics in 
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original). While acknowledging the role of economic interests in group preference formation, 
they emphasize the conflict over norms and values in all of the four cleavages (see for 
instance Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 11; 15; 19). When it comes to the specific issue of class 
voting, they write that “[c]onflicts between workers and employers have always contained 
elements of economic bargaining, but there have also often been strong elements of cultural 
opposition and ideological insulation.” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 18). Amongst more 
contemporary scholars, Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995: 494) even includes value orientations 
as a part of the definition of a cleavage, as formerly mentioned: “…a cleavage engages some 
set of values common to members of the group; group members know a ‘common life’ in so 
far as they share the same value orientation.” (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494).1 
In chapter 4, we will test the mechanism suggested by the political-sociological approach. We 
will compare the bivariate relationship between class and party family specific voting with 
class voting after controlling for the most important value orientations. How much of the 
effect of class is indirect through value orientations? Which value orientations account for 
most class voting? How does this differ between party families? These are central questions to 
be answered in the last two chapters of this thesis. Evans (2010) is highly critical of the lack 
of work in this area. Our analysis does exactly what he recommends:  
“Multi-variate analysis should preferably start with reduced form models that contain only 
structural characteristics. More elaborate specifications that include both structural and 
potential mechanisms can then be introduced in a path-analytical framework that allows 
explicit tests of the role of perceptions and attitudes in connecting structural positions and 
political preferences.” (Evans 2010: 638). 
Nevertheless, before we can test mechanisms of class voting, we need to describe the 
phenomenon properly. This is what we will do in the third chapter. A detailed description of 
the class basis of the party families in eighteen West European countries will give us an 
impression of the need for a more nuanced party choice variable. Notably, we will be able to 
ascertain whether some of the non-manual classes vote for the New Left and whether the 
manual classes vote for the New Right. We might also discover other patterns that we have 
not hitherto found. We will see whether parties belonging to a certain party family have the 
same class basis or not. The strength of class voting, described for instance by Knutsen (2006) 
                                                 
1
 For a more in-depth discussion of the three schools of thought, please refer to Antunes (2010) 
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via the kappa index, will also be disentangled. We will see which classes that contribute to the 
strength of class voting. What classes vote disproportionally in favour of each party family 
and which do the opposite? Does this differ between countries? 
In sum, the aim of this thesis is twofold: To describe the class basis of the West European 
party families and the strength of class voting; and to test one of the mechanisms creating the 
differences we discover. It is hoped that in doing so, some light will also be shed on the 
methodological issue of what dependent variable to choose in future studies of class voting.  
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
2.1 Data: The European Values Study 2008 
The European Values Study (EVS) is a decennial survey, occupied with the values of 
Europeans. There are six main topics: Life, Family, Work, Religion, Politics, and Society. We 
will be using the latest version at the time of writing, i.e. the one from 2008. The interviews 
were conducted face-to-face by trained field workers who made at least three revisits in case 
of not reaching the respondent at the first visit. All countries employed a representative multi-
stage random sample of the adult population of 18 years or older. The sample consists of 
approximately 1,500 respondents for each of the 47 countries/regions, although there is some 
covariation between the size of the samples and the size of the population in the 
countries/regions. All information in this section is gathered from their website.
2
  
The specific data set we are using is an edited version of the EVS 2008 where only the 
relevant West European countries are kept. We have a total of 25,299 respondents from 18 
countries. The country samples vary from 808 in Iceland to 2,038 in Germany. Detailed 
descriptive statistics are to be found in the appendix, section A.2. 
2.2 Variables 
2.2.1 The independent variable: Social class 
 
Social class is obviously a key concept in studies of class voting. As mentioned in section 1.1, 
the first two generations used the simple manual/non-manual divide when studying class 
voting (Alford 1962), but this way of measuring class was increasingly criticized and 
rendered less relevant throughout the third generation of class voting studies. The most 
important alternatives today are different variations of the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero 
(EGP) class schema and variations of the class schema of Daniel Oesch (2006a).  
The EGP class schema was first developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979), 
and then updated and improved by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). The class schema is based 
on a distinction between the position of an individual within labour markets and production 
units. First a distinction between employers, employees and the self-employed is drawn, 
                                                 
2
 http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu  
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derived from both the Weberian and Marxian tradition (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). 
Distinctions are drawn between large employers and small employers, and, within the latter 
group, between those belonging to industry and agriculture. The self-employed are also 
divided into an industrial and an agricultural component (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36). 
However, the basic distinction in the schema, according to Knutsen (2006: 14) is within the 
category of the employees. These are separated depending on their relationship to their 
employer.  
A main distinction here, following Weber, is between employees with a service relationship 
to their employer and those with a labour contract. If the employer has delegated authority to 
the employee or the employee uses specialized knowledge and expertise, there is a service 
relationship between the two. These positions are usually characterised by a certain amount of 
autonomy, and the performance of the employee is based on a degree of moral commitment 
rather than external sanctions. The relationship requires that the employer invests trust in the 
employee, and is usually a rather durable relationship. Those with a labour contract, on the 
other hand, usually perform more or less routinized tasks under supervision, and are paid in 
wages rather than salaries (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 41-42). However, the service 
relationship and the labour contract must be seen as ideal types, and many occupations fall in-
between. On this basis, the EGP schema differentiates between the eleven classes outlined in 
figure 2.1.
3
 
[Figure 2.1 here]
4
 
However, this theoretical 11-class schema is not very suitable for empirical analysis. Erikson 
and Goldthorpe (1992: 35-37) insist that some classes must be collapsed to ensure cross-
national comparability and to avoid cell counts that are unreliably low. Our collapsed six class 
schema is based on the collapsed five class version of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero 
(1979: 425), except that we have kept the distinction between skilled and unskilled manual 
workers. This is because there are some theoretical reasons to believe that these groups may 
differ in terms of support for certain party families (see chapter 3).  
                                                 
3
 Due to the extensive use of this schema in class research during the last decades, a further introduction seems 
redundant. The interested reader may consult Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) and Erikson and 
Goldthorpe (1992: chapter 2). 
4
 Sometimes it is not possible to place the tables or figures where they are supposed to be, for reasons related to 
layout and text flow. In these cases, we have written where the table or figure ideally should be, like here, and 
then it is inserted as soon as possible after this. 
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Figure 2.1: The EGP 11-class schema. 
Employers 
Large Class I 
Small 
Industry  IVa 
Agriculture IVc 
Self-
Employed  
Industry IVb 
Agriculture IVc 
Employees 
Service 
Relationship 
Professional, higher technical, 
administrative and management 
Higher grade I 
Lower grade II 
Intermediate  
Routine, non-manual 
Higher grade IIIa 
Lower grade IIIb 
Lower technical, and manual, supervisory V 
Labour Contract Manual 
Industry 
Skilled VI 
Unskilled VIIa 
Non-industry Agriculture VIIb 
Based on figure 2.1 in Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36. 
On the other hand, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to combine the farmers 
with the petite bourgeoisie. As we will see, Oesch (2006b: 269) categorizes both farmers and 
other self-employed as petite bourgeoisie, based on theoretical arguments about their 
employment status (self-employed) and their marketable skills. The traditional Marxist use of 
the term includes farmers (Kitschelt 1994: 26). It is also common in the empirical parts of the 
literature to combine the two groups (see for instance Evans and De Graaf 2013), and they do 
indeed vote rather similarly.
5
  
Another reason to combine the groups is that there are so few farmers (and also rather few 
petty bourgeois) within most countries that the estimates of class voting for these groups in 
the survey material are surrounded by extreme uncertainty. Any findings would be severely 
limited by doubt of whether they are a property of the sample or the population. Also, like 
Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013: 124), we want to avoid too small categories. Empty cells 
make it impossible to calculate log odds ratios. There is one drawback, however: Keeping 
farmers as a separate class would make it easier to analyse the class cleavage in the 
commodity market, namely the one between producers and consumers of agricultural products 
(see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This would be particularly relevant when analysing the class 
basis of the Agrarian party family (see section 3.4).   
                                                 
5
 I have calculated the percentages of farmers and petty bourgeois voting for different parties in different 
countries separately. For most party families (with some exceptions, like Agrarian and Radical Right parties), 
these groups tend to vote rather similarly.  
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Table 2.1 shows how the applied class schema in this thesis compares to the original 11-class 
schema. 
Table 2.1: The Applied Class Schema 
Types of occupations, EGP Classes and terms used in this study 
Class I: Higher-grade professionals, 
administrators and officials; managers in large 
industrial establishments; large proprietors 
Higher Service Class 
Class II: Lower-grade professionals, 
administrators and officials; higher-grade 
technicians; managers in small business and 
industrial establishments; supervisors of non-
manual employees 
Lower service class 
Class IIIa: Higher grade routine non-manual 
employees (administration and commerce)  
Routine non-manual employees Class IIIb: Lower grade routine non-manual 
employees (sales and services; other rank-and-
file employees) 
Class IVa: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., 
with employees 
Petite bourgeoisie 
Class IVb: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., 
without employees 
Class IVc: Farmers and smallholders; self-
employed fishermen 
Class V: Lower-grade technicians; supervisors 
of manual workers Skilled manual workers 
Class VI: Skilled manual workers 
VIIa: Semi- and unskilled workers (not in 
agriculture) Unskilled manual workers 
VIIb: Agricultural workers 
Source: Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero 1979: 420; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36. 
The other major modern alternative is the class schema of Daniel Oesch (2006a). While he 
does include hierarchical divisions through employment relationships and marketable skills, 
like Erikson and Goldthorpe, he adds a horizontal dimension to it: the work logic. Jobs within 
the same employment relationship may differ significantly in their setting of work process; 
their relations of authority; their primary orientation and the skill requirements (Oesch 2006b: 
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265-268). With these traits, Oesch (2006b: 269) creates a 17-class schema based on four 
different work logics (independent; technical; organizational; interpersonal service) and four 
different marketable skills (professional/managerial; associate professional/managerial; 
general/vocational; low/unskilled). This schema does to a greater extent than the EGP schema 
take into account the increasing heterogeneity of the service class
6
, like the distinction 
between socio-cultural specialists, higher-grade managers and technical experts. 
While the schema of Oesch is highly interesting and increasingly popular (see for instance 
Kitschelt 2013: 229-231), we will stick with the EGP class schema in this thesis. First and 
most importantly, this is still “the only systematically validated measure of class position 
available for use in this sort of large scale comparative project” (Evans and De Graaf 2013a: 
13). Also, we want to shed some light upon the need for the fourth generation party choice 
variable. Hence it is an obvious advantage to be able to compare our findings with those of 
the third generation – which usually applied this schema.  
Our EGP class variable is based on question 112 in the EVS 2008 questionnaire, where the 
respondent is asked the title of his or her main job (or, if not employed at the moment, the title 
of the last job) and question 112a, where the respondent is asked what kind of work he/she 
does or did do most of the time. On the basis of these two questions, the interviewer codes the 
job using the ISCO88 system. These codes are transferred into the full 11-class EGP schema. 
We then created the EGP6-variable by combining some classes as shown in table 2.2. For 
descriptive statistics, please refer to appendix A.2.1, which also shows considerable cross-
national variations in class composition.        
2.2.2 The dependent variable: Party choice 
The need for a more nuanced party choice variable in the class voting literature was discussed 
in section 1.2. Here, we will rather focus on the concrete operationalization. In a case study, 
one could simply use the national parties as individual nominal vote options; but comparative 
studies need to categorize the parties into some form of party families (Knutsen 2004: 14; 
Mair and Mudde 1998: 212).  
Party families may be classified by criteria such as names, historical traditions and origins, 
party programmes or memberships in transnational party organisations (Mair and Mudde 
1998). The classification used here will be based on the first three of these. I follow Knutsen’s 
                                                 
6
 According to Kitschelt (2013: 231), this class «blows apart» because they differ on a number of dimensions. 
15 
 
approach, which is built upon former classifications like von Beyme’s (1985).7 The 
categorization includes ten party families: Communist, Left Socialist, Green, Social 
Democratic, Agrarian, Ethnic/Regional, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, and 
Radical Right parties (Knutsen 2004: 14-19; Knutsen 2006: 34-39). The parties are 
categorized into the different party families based on Knutsen’s expert judgement, rather than 
for instance party manifestos or voter surveys (see Bakker and Hobolt 2013: 31).
8
 We will 
discuss these party families more in detail in chapter 3.  
Classification of parties into party families poses several challenges, although we avoid some 
of them here. First, the party family schemas may be geographically limited to Western 
Europe, for which they were usually developed. This is no problem here, as this thesis limits 
itself to that particular geographic area. Second, time may render the party families 
increasingly outdated as politics change (Mair and Mudde 1998: 215). This should not pose 
any problems: The classification used is recently developed (Knutsen 2004; 2006), and the 
analysis is not cross-temporal.  
We have chosen a “vote intention” approach to measure party choice, namely question 75a in 
the EVS 2008. In other words, the respondents answer what party they would vote for if a 
general election were to be held the next day. This question avoids recall problems one might 
have if asked what one voted for in the last election, which could turn out to be several years 
ago (Knutsen 2004: 19). When the respondents have indicated that they would not vote, we 
have used question 75b, asking what party appeals the most to the respondent. On the basis of 
these two variables, we have constructed a party family preference variable. As we utilize the 
same data set as Knutsen (2012), this party choice variable is constructed in the exact same 
way as his (see Knutsen 2012: 11). Descriptive statistics may be found in section A.2.2 in the 
appendix. 
There will be one section for each party family to be analysed. The dependent variable will 
consist of a dichotomy coded 1 if the respondent voted for the particular party family (or 
declared it as the most appealing) and 0 if the respondent voted for any other party family. 
Responders who did not vote or did not reply to any of the two questions above are excluded 
from the analysis. 
                                                 
7
 This is, in turn, built upon an expansion of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) conflict model, with 10 conflicts 
considered to shape the West European party systems (von Beyme 1985: 23-25) 
8
 For a full list of exactly how each party was coded, please refer to section A.1.1 in the appendix.  
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2.2.3 The intermediate variables: The value orientations 
As mentioned in chapter 1, we wish to assess the relevance of value orientations as 
intermediate variables between social class and voting. Values are here defined as 
“conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable but are evident in moral 
discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes” (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 46). 
To translate unobservable values into an empirically useful device, van Deth and Scarbrough 
(1995: 41-43; 46) consider attitude patterns which are constrained by the values, called value 
orientations.  
While van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) identifies three important value orientations, later 
work has expanded on this. Knutsen (2012: 4-5) argues that there are five important political 
value orientations that are relevant for explaining party choice in modern, West-European 
societies. The first two are derived from the structural cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967). These are often said to belong to “Old Politics”, meaning that they are related to 
traditional conflicts in industrial societies. The religious cleavage has given roots to a 
religious versus secular value orientation. Here, religious values, such as traditional and 
Christian morals, stand against secular values where people wish to make their own decisions 
without the guidelines of the church. The Industrial Revolution, in turn, gave rise to a value 
orientation related to economic ideology, often referred to as economic left-right values or 
left-right materialist values. The main issues in this value orientation are related to questions 
of economic (in-)equalities, ownership of the means of production, and conflict over the 
desirability of a market economy (Knutsen 1995: 160). 
Based on a discussion of former works in the subfield, Knutsen (2012: 5-6) uses three value 
orientations related to “New Politics”, meaning that they are connected to post-industrial 
conflicts. The first of these is the libertarian-authoritarian value orientation. While libertarians 
emphasize self-actualisation, autonomy, openness and self-betterment, the authoritarians are 
concerned with ideas of law and order, authority, discipline, and dutifulness. While both 
Kitschelt (1994, 1995) and Flanagan (1987) include items related to immigration, patriotism 
or resistance to ethnic diversity at the authoritarian pole, these have been singled out by 
Knutsen (2012: 6) as a value orientation in and of themselves. Environmental versus 
economic growth values are the last, and perhaps most manifest, value orientation related to 
New Politics.  
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Utilizing the same data set as Knutsen (2012), namely EVS 2008, we are able to use the exact 
same operationalization of these value orientations that he did. While the details are to be 
found in the appendix, a short note should be made here. The indexes were constructed by 
combining the answers to several substantial questions related to the value orientations at 
hand. The only exception to this is the religious-secular value orientation, where several 
substantial questions of the religious beliefs of the respondent were asked and used as a proxy 
of their religious-secular values. To our credit, we avoid ideological self-placement scales. 
These receive heavy criticism from scholars such as Evans (2010: 636-637) for confusing the 
independent and the dependent variable.
9
 
To be able to comprehend the analyses in chapter 4, it is vital to know the direction of the 
indexes. They all go from 0-10. A high score on the economic left-right value orientation 
(economic ideology in chapter 4) indicates a leftist position. A high score on the religious-
secular value orientation (religiosity) indicates a high level of religiosity. High scores on the 
environmental versus growth value orientation (environmental values) are more concerned 
with the environment. Higher scores on the libertarian-authoritarian value orientation 
(libertarianism) imply a higher level of libertarianism. The immigration value orientation 
(immigration orientations) has a high score when the respondent is positive to immigration 
and immigrants. The exact operationalization and construction of the value orientation 
indexes are discussed in section A.1.2, and descriptive statistics are available in section A.2.3. 
2.3 Research Strategy  
2.3.1 Description 
In chapter 3, we will describe the class basis of the party families in Western Europe. There 
will be one section for each party family. We will start with a short theoretical subsection with 
some hypotheses of what to expect from the bivariate relationship between class and voting 
for the particular party family. 
The hypotheses are derived from theoretical expectations of where the classes and party 
families are positioned in the two-dimensional Western European political space. Inspired by 
Kitschelt’s (1994) framework, we assume that the political space is divided by an economic 
                                                 
9
 In other words, many voters will for instance place themselves in the «Left»-category if they vote for a party on 
the Left and vice versa, yielding an overlap between the independent variable (in this case the economic left-
right value orientation) and the dependent variable (party choice). 
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axis (socialist-capitalist, in Kitschelt’s terminology) and a value axis (libertarian-
authoritarian). Whereas West European politics were formerly concerned with mainly a 
materialist conflict of distribution and control of the means of production, modern society has 
seen an increase in highly educated, client-oriented, female employees. This shift, in turn, has 
changed the political space from “a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist 
(right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing the left-libertarian and right-
authoritarian alternatives” (Kitschelt 1994: 30-31). Kitschelt (1994: 20-27) discusses the 
position of the different layers of society in this two-dimensional space (see figure 2.2). 
[Figure 2.2 here] 
This model is our starting point. As we see in figure 2.2, Kitschelt argues that the petite 
bourgeoisie is both most authoritarian and most economically right-wing. People in low-skill 
jobs in domestic services and manufacturing are positioned as centrist on the economic axis 
and authoritarian on the value axis. These are similar to our unskilled workers. Those with 
“high skill jobs in internationally competitive and service sectors” are assumed to be 
somewhat less authoritarian, but still centrist economically speaking. The administrative and 
manual public sector jobs are considered to be somewhat libertarian and left-wing. Liberal 
professionals and corporate organization men are mostly regarded as authoritarian and 
economically right-wing. High-skill employees processing symbols and clients in the private 
sector are fragmented when it comes to economic ideology, but are libertarian. Employees 
with high education processing symbol and clients in the public sector are placed in the left-
libertarian corner of the two-dimensional space.    
However, we cannot use this model in its current form, as Kitschelt’s classification of social 
groups differs from the EGP schema. Notably, Kitschelt separates private and public jobs, 
which our schema does not; whereas our schema separates the manual and service sectors; 
which Kitschelt does not always do. The main point is that we will use the same framework. 
We will rely on theoretical and empirical contributions throughout chapter 3 and 4 to position 
the EGP-classes within the two-dimensional political space. We will, as mentioned in section 
2.2.3, analytically distinguish the value axis into three different New Politics components: 
Environmentalism, immigration values, and libertarianism proper. After positioning the 
classes, we will do the same for the party families. This is similar to what Kitschelt (1994: 30-
37) does when he discusses the current positioning and possible future strategies for social 
democratic parties (see Kitschelt 1994: 32). 
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Figure 2.2: Ideology and occupational groups in advanced capitalist democracies 
 
 
Source: Figure 2 in Kitschelt (1994: 27) 
 
As this is a study of the demand-side of politics, the position of the party families are 
extracted from relevant literature and assumed to be the same across individual party family 
members. In reality, individual parties within a party family may of course differ from these 
positions. Future research should follow the approach recently developed by Evans and De 
Graaf (2013), integrating the demand and supply side of politics to model the party specific 
positions – but that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The hypotheses are thus also based on a Downsian (1957) view of voting, where we assume 
that voters normally try to minimize the political distance between the party they vote for and 
their own views (although in some cases this view may be qualified, see for instance section 
3.3.1).  
After developing the party family specific hypotheses, we move on to present an empirical 
part where the support of the party family according to class within each country is presented. 
By looking at the shares of each class voting for the given party family in each country, we 
can see whether the class basis is the same for all parties in the party families. The log odds 
ratios are usually considered in the class voting literature because they are insensitive to 
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changes in the overall support for parties or party groups (Knutsen 2006: 52). Although this 
study is not longitudinal, log odds ratios will be used because they are also insensitive to 
differences in the overall support for parties.  
There are, however, three problems with log odds ratios. The first is that, although the 
measure is insensitive to differences in the overall support, small parties are in a way more 
likely to obtain large (positive or negative) log odds ratios by chance, because a one 
percentage point increase in support in one social class (which is by far within the margin of 
error) will increase or decrease the log odds ratio by much more for a party with 1% of the 
total votes than for a party with 10% of the total votes. This may be dealt with to a certain 
extent by being especially aware of the absolute percentage differences when considering 
differences in support for very small parties between social classes. If deviations from the 
expected log odds ratio pattern in chapter 3 are found to be due to tiny parties, they will not be 
discussed in detail. 
The other problem is that a log odds ratio by definition is a comparison of two groups. It 
shows us how the classes vote compared to the reference group, in our case the unskilled 
workers. What we need is a coefficient for the total relationship between class and voting. 
Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) launched the kappa index for this purpose, which measures 
total class voting. By using the standard deviation of the log odds ratios of the classes, we can 
measure the difference in voting behaviour between the classes. The higher the value, the 
more the classes differ in their voting behaviour. Whereas the kappa index does not tell us 
whether the parties within a party family have the same class basis, it does give us a handy 
measure of the strength of class voting; i.e. how much the classes differ in voting for each 
particular party in the particular party family (see also Knutsen 2006: 52-53).  
The third problem is that no log odds ratio (and hence no kappa value) can be obtained when 
a party has no voters in the sample belonging to a particular class in a particular country. This 
is especially likely when considering the support of small parties within small classes, like the 
support of the Norwegian Left Socialists within the petite bourgeoisie. As mentioned, this is 
one of the reasons as to why we combined the farmers with the petite bourgeoisie. 
Finally, we conclude chapter 3 by comparing the strength of class voting for each party 
family. We will do this by calculating the mean of the kappa values for each party within a 
party family, and a kappa value based on the mean support of the party family. The first 
measure will illuminate how class based a party family is; the second will help us see to what 
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degree the party family has the same class basis in all countries. We discuss this further in 
section 3.9. 
2.3.2 Testing mechanisms: Multilevel logistic regression 
To test one of the mechanisms leading to the differences we find between the classes, we will 
first analyse the bivariate relationship between class and voting for each party family (model 
1 in chapter 4). As the model will be logistic (see below), the coefficient for each class will be 
their log odds ratio compared to the unskilled workers, our reference group. Based on these 
log odds ratios, we may calculate a kappa value (the standard deviation of the log odds ratios). 
The kappa value obtained from a logistic regression without controls is labelled “gross kappa” 
by Hout et al. (1995: 809), measuring total class voting. In our case we will refer to it as 
measuring “total party family specific class voting”, as our analyses are done separately for 
each party family.  
For each analysis, we will exclude the countries which do not have the relevant party family 
in its political system. The dependent variable will be a dichotomy: Voting for the specific 
party family versus voting for any other party family. As Dolezal (2010: 542) did in his 
analysis of Green voting, we will exclude non-voters and respondents who did not answer the 
question of what they voted for or what party that appeals the most to them. 
Second, we will control for each of the value orientation variables discussed in section 2.2.3 
one by one, and see how these change the class coefficients (model 2-6 in chapter 4). As we 
do not expect any single value orientation to account for all of the class voting, we need a way 
to measure how much of the class voting that is accounted for. We will do this by calculating 
a kappa value for each model, based on the coefficients of the classes. Hout et al. (1995: 809) 
refers to this as the “net kappa”. Considering the change in the kappa value after controlling 
for a value orientation (net kappa) compared with the kappa value from the bivariate model 1 
(gross kappa), we will see how much of the total party family specific class voting the value 
orientation accounts for. It should be mentioned that as the log odds ratios are non-linear 
measures, a 20 % reduction in the kappa value does not necessarily equal a 20 % reduction in 
class differences. The reduction in the kappa values, i.e. in total party family specific class 
voting, will be seen as a rough measure of how much of the class differences the value 
orientation accounts for. 
Finally, we control for all the value orientations at the same time (model 7 in chapter 4), to 
see how much of the total party family specific class voting they account for together. We will 
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refer to this as “direct party family specific class voting”. In Hout et al.’s (1995) terminology, 
we compare the gross kappa with the net kappa. 
To visualize the results, we also calculate and plot the predicted probabilities
10
 of voting for 
the particular party family for each class, for a selected few of the models most relevant to our 
hypotheses. If the differences in predicted probabilities are reduced at any given level of the 
control variable, the magnitude of the reduction is a sign of how much of the bivariate class-
voting relationship we have accounted for. 
We need to choose a statistical model that is suitable for the purpose. There are several special 
statistical traits we must account for with the research question at hand. First, the dependent 
variable for each analysis will be dichotomous, as mentioned in section 2.2.2. Thus we must 
use logistic regression to avoid predictions outside the possible range (0-1) and to avoid 
violation of certain assumptions of linear regression (see Skog 2004: 352-353, 360, 377).  
In addition, also the general assumption that every respondent is independent of all other 
respondents (Skog 2004: 380) may be violated. In many cases respondents are more similar to 
each other within a given country than between countries: There is within-country 
homogeneity. The respondents are nested in their national political systems, meaning that they 
belong to a country with a political system which has a homogenizing effect on them. This 
affects the standard errors, as we assume more information from each respondent than we 
actually obtain (see Bickel 2007: 145; 180).  
For each party family to be analysed, we will first test whether the statistical dependency 
between respondents in each country is large enough to need to be dealt with by for instance 
multilevel analysis. Since this is multilevel logistic regression, we may perform a likelihood 
ratio test for the null hypothesis that the residual variance at the country level (also called, 
more generally, “level 2 variance” or “cluster variance”) equals 0. In other words, we test the 
null hypothesis that the intercept does not vary between countries (see Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2012: 536). This test is performed for each subchapter before analysis commences, 
although we expect this test to show country level residual variance – after all, we already 
know that the support for the party families varies in different countries.
11
 
                                                 
10
 The predicted marginal or population-averaged probabilities; not the mean or mode of the predicted subject-
specific probabilities (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 548-557).  
11
 As these tests predictably gave the expected results in all cases, they are not reported. The interested reader 
may be sent the test results on demand. 
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We can deal with this statistical dependency in several ways. We could use a fixed effects 
model by incorporating dummy variables for each country except one – this would, however, 
require a huge amount of extra parameters to be estimated (17 in the case of the Social 
Democrats) and thus not be very efficient. It may also give inconsistent estimates (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 557). We could use ordinary logistic regression with cluster 
robust standard errors, thus “controlling” for the dependency as a statistical nuisance, or we 
could use multilevel logistic regression, which considers the variances as interesting in and of 
themselves. In this thesis, we will employ the latter. This method should be of huge interest to 
the class voting literature, as it makes it possible to calculate how much the effect of class 
varies between countries and how much of this variation we can “explain” by adding country 
level variables, like party polarization or GDP/capita. However, with a class schema of six 
classes suspected to have non-linear effects, we would have to run a model with six random 
parameters (the random intercept and five random slopes), meaning that six coefficients are 
allowed to vary between countries. Logistic multilevel models are computationally 
demanding even with just the random intercept.
12
 For this reason, such a study must be left to 
others with more computer power, manpower, and time than those we dispose of at the 
moment.  
This is also an important reason for running separate analyses for each party family, rather 
than running a single multinomial logistic regression where all party families are analysed at 
the same time. In multinomial logistic regression, each variable would have one coefficient 
for each category of the dependent variable except the reference category. Even the simple 
bivariate model with six classes and eight party families would yield more than 35 
parameters.  
Another issue is that of sample size. Our analyses naturally include between 18 (countries 
with Social Democratic parties) and 5 (Agrarian) level 2 units. Although there is some 
disagreement on the topic, a much cited “rule of thumb” is that we at least need 30 level 1 
units in each of at least 30 level 2 units to get reliable variance estimates (the 30/30-rule, see 
Kreft (1996)). There have also been some discussions about possible bias in coefficients and 
                                                 
12
 and the increase in calculation time is approximately proportional to the number of random coefficients times 
the number of integration points used (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 541). In this study, the number of 
integration points has been gradually increased until the results are stable. This has been done for each and every 
model, as recommended by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012: 540). 
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standard errors of level 2 variables, but these are not relevant here, as we will not include 
level 2 variables in this thesis. However, later studies should look closer into this, as 
mentioned. 
In any case, as Andrew Gelman (2014) has briefly argued, multilevel analysis could be used 
at any number of level 2 units. This is due to the fact that a non-multilevel analysis is 
equivalent to a multilevel analysis where the level 2 residual variance is set to 0 or infinity, 
which hardly can be said to be better than a biased estimate. Nevertheless, the intercept 
variances and changes in these between the models will only briefly be commented upon, and 
they will not be given considerable weight in our interpretation of the results. For the analyses 
with the fewest level 2 units, like those including Agrarian parties, we will not discuss the 
intercept variances at all. When it comes to possible bias in the estimation of the fixed effects 
in the multilevel models, we will also run all models with an ordinary logistic model with 
cluster robust standard errors. If these differ substantially from the estimates from the 
multilevel models, this will be commented upon. 
Finally, there is some confusion as to whether or not to use survey weights and how to use 
them in multilevel logistic regression. The standard function for multilevel logistic regression 
in Stata at the time of writing, xtmelogit, does not even allow the use of weights. Kolenikov 
(2008) explains this: “The basic reason is that the weights can apply to different levels, and 
there is no literature consensus as to what’s the best way to go about that even in simpler 
linear models…”  
The models in this thesis are normally run with the regular xtmelogit command in Stata, 
unweighted. To test the robustness of the results – to test whether they are sensitive to small 
changes in the model specifications – all models are also estimated with the gllamm command 
(see Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004), which allows the use of weights. We will 
run three alternative specifications: One with total weights on level 1, one with total weights 
on level 2, and one with separate level 1 and level 2 weights. The models will also, as 
mentioned, be run with a fourth alternative specification: Ordinary logistic regression with 
cluster robust standard errors and applied importance weights. If the results differ 
substantially from those reported in chapter 4, this will be commented upon in footnotes as 
the “alternative specifications”. The results from all the alternative specifications are available 
upon request.   
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In chapter 5, we will conclude the thesis by summing up how much class voting each value 
orientation accounts for on average, and how this varies by party family. 
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Chapter 3: The Class Basis of the West-
European Party Families 
 
There is no way to explain a phenomenon which we have not yet described properly; or else 
we would not know what to explain. What follows is a complete description of the class basis 
of West European parties belonging to either of the party families mentioned above, with two 
exceptions. The Communist parties have so few voters in the samples from most of the 
countries (there are exceptions, like Greece and Portugal) that there are plenty of empty cells. 
This ruins the calculation of log odds ratios and highly affects the kappa values. Thus, there is 
no subchapter for the Communist parties. Also, the ethnic-regional parties are not presented in 
this chapter. These are very few (Svenska Folkpartiet in Finland; the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
in Belgium; and the Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru in Great Britain) and very 
different from each other – they are also popular with different classes.  
First, we will briefly discuss what class basis to expect for each party family given the 
literature; then we will assess the class basis empirically. The hypotheses about what to expect 
necessarily include explanatory claims (or at least correlational ones) that attempt to justify 
the bivariate relationship between class and voting, but notice that even when the class basis 
is as predicted, this does not confirm the causal claims. True predictions do not necessitate 
true explanations. In chapter 4, however, we will attempt to test some of the explanations. 
The hypotheses are as mentioned mainly derived from theoretical expectations of where the 
classes are positioned on the two political axes of Kitschelt (1994). These are the economic 
axis (socialist-capitalist) and the value axis (libertarian-authoritarian). As discussed in chapter 
2, we split the New Politics orientations – or what Kitschelt called “libertarianism” – into 
three value orientations: Environmentalism, immigration orientations, and libertarianism 
proper. The working classes are assumed to be economically progressive (left-wing), and the 
service classes to be economically conservative (right-wing). On the other hand, we expect 
the middle class to be libertarian and the working classes to be authoritarian. We also expect 
these values to affect voting. These statements are broadly supported in the literature (for a 
short review, see Achterberg 2006: 241-242). We will go in-depth on what to expect from 
each social class in the sections to come. 
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3.1 The Left Socialist Parties 
The Left Socialist (hereafter: LS
13
) party family is based on a post-materialistic conflict of 
values, rather than a materialistic conflict of resources (Oesch 2013: 31), although its roots are 
partly to be found in economic left-opposition to the Social Democrats. After the suppression 
of the reform movements in Hungary in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in 1968, communism 
lost much of what was left of its credibility as a progressive force. At the same time, social 
democracy had prospered with the growing economy which went into recession in 1973, 
bringing with it the fall of Keynesianism and leaving social democracy in disarray. In the 
years that followed, the Communist and Social Democratic parties no longer hegemonized the 
Left, thus opening space for new leftist parties (Eley 2002: 5-8). Among the most successful 
of these still in existence is the Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti. The parties in this party family 
typically combine a leftist economic view with a libertarian or post-materialistic value stance 
on issues such as abortion, the protection of the environment, participatory democracy and 
gay rights (Eley 2002: part IV).       
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
According to Oesch (2013: 31-32), the rise of the New Left and the Radical Right has been 
interpreted as signs of the end of class politics, as these parties no longer were based in 
particular social groups. However, Oesch strongly contends this interpretation and claims that 
the New Left and Radical Right have diametrically opposed class structures. This is in line 
with the view of Herbert Kitschelt (1994) that modern societies are divided along a 
libertarian-authoritarian axis which is based on cultural and value issues (lifestyle, sexuality, 
immigration, and so on). Kitschelt suggests that the New Left occupies an extreme position 
along this axis, near the libertarian pole. 
Let us first consider the workers. As will be explicated in greater detail in section 3.8 on the 
Radical Right, workers are especially negative to immigration, both for economic (domestic 
and international competition) and cultural reasons. In addition, they are prone to 
authoritarianism due to a comparably low level of education. Kitschelt (1994: 27) places the 
“low-skill jobs in domestic services and manufacturing” as one of the most authoritarian 
groups in modern societies. The high skill jobs in the internationally competitive 
manufacturing and service sectors are seen as occupying a middle ground in this respect. Both 
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 A list of all abbreviations used in this thesis is to be found in the appendix. The abbreviations and the full 
names will be used interchangeably based on esthetical considerations. 
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groups are seen as occupying a centre position along the economic axis in Kitschelt’s 
framework. However, Knutsen (1995: 179-180) anticipate that the working class will be more 
left materialist. Administrative and manual public sector employees are regarded as more 
socialist. We suspect that the routine non-manual employees in the EGP schema are more 
likely to vote Socialist Left than the workers as the former are more often public employees 
and also (per definition) working in the service sector, which is less affected by economic 
competition from abroad. 
The petite bourgeoisie (which includes the farmers) combines low education and strong 
authoritarianism with higher income and more right-wing economic views than the workers 
(see Kitschelt 1994: 27).  
The LS parties are believed to occupy an extreme left-libertarian position in Kitschelt’s 
framework, i.e. be libertarian on issues like crime, sexuality and immigration, while favouring 
redistribution or at the very least a large public sector. Thus, the following hypotheses may be 
extracted:  
Hypothesis 3.1.1: The petite bourgeoisie is least likely to vote Left Socialist 
Hypothesis 3.1.2: Unskilled manual workers are more likely to vote Left Socialist than the 
petite bourgeoisie, but less so than the other classes 
Hypothesis 3.1.3: Skilled manual workers are more likely to vote Left Socialist than the 
unskilled ones, but less likely than the non-manual employees 
If these hypotheses turn out to be true, the idea that we need a more nuanced party choice 
variable is strengthened, as they imply that workers disproportionally rarely vote for this party 
family, which would be considered “Left” when using the dichotomous dependent variable. 
This could partly explain why traditional and overall left-right class voting seem to be 
declining.  
The service classes in many ways occupy the other extreme of the petite bourgeoisie when it 
comes to the value axis. Highly educated, skilled and seldom facing economic competition 
from immigrants, the service classes are likely to be libertarian. This is in line with Inglehart’s 
(1990) argument that in modern society, the affluent are less occupied with material 
questions, and more with post-materialistic issues – which overlap to a certain degree with 
what Kitschelt terms “libertarian” values (Achterberg 2006: 240). However, the group is 
divided when it comes to the economic axis. Whereas some scholars, like John Goldthorpe 
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(1982), claim that the service classes will be conservative, others have claimed that they are 
more fragmented (see Knutsen 1995: 181; 2006: 6-7). Assuming that the service classes are 
the most libertarian along the value axis and fragmented along the economic axis, we 
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 3.1.4: The service classes will be most likely to vote Left Socialist. 
3.1.2 The Class Basis of the Socialist Left in Western Europe 
Table 3.1 shows the percentage of the respondents in the EVS data that said they would vote 
for the Left Socialist party in their national elections, by country and class. The calculated 
kappa value for each party is observed in the column to the right. 
Table 3.1: Support for the Left Socialist parties in percent, according to class 
 Hi 
serv. 
Lo 
serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Denmark
14
 14 24 32 4 15 20 21 0.77 
Finland 3 3 7 5 15 13 6 0.73 
Iceland 13 25 25 19 11 20 20 0.37 
Norway 10 7 7 3 0 6 7 - 
Sweden 4 8 8 4 9 8 8 0.38 
Ireland 3 5 9 4 18 17 10 0.73 
Germany 12 11 9 6 14 12 11 0.30 
Luxembourg 2 4 1 0 1 1 2 - 
Netherlands 10 11 16 1 12 16 12 1.00 
France 4 6 5 5 11 8 6 0.38 
Greece 15 21 8 5 9 10 10 0.53 
Italy 5 2 4 4 4 1 3 0.64 
Portugal 11 17 9 3 5 2 7 0.83 
Spain 17 14 8 3 10 7 9 0.56 
Mean 9 11 11 5 10 10 9  
 
Hypothesis 3.1.1 is generally confirmed. The petite bourgeoisie is least likely to vote LS in 
most countries, although there are some exceptions. The Vasemmistoliitto (LWA, Left-Wing 
Alliance) in Finland is even less popular amongst the service class, which is normally the 
most eager supporter of this party family. The LWA was formerly a Communist party. 
Although it has taken sincere steps in a post-materialist direction, it still has retained some of 
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 The countries are sorted first by region, then alphabetically within the regions. This is done to facilitate 
regional comparisons. 
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its Old Politics profile, and it takes time to change the electoral base. In addition, the Green 
party in Finland has been dominant on New Politics issues, decreasing the political space for a 
whole-hearted New Politics turn for the LWA (Ziliacus 2001). In Iceland both the skilled 
workers and the higher service class are less prone to support the VG than the petite 
bourgeoisie. In Portugal the unskilled workers are – barely – less likely to vote for the Bloco 
de Esquerda (Left Bloc) than the petite bourgeoisie. This might also be due to issues of 
political space. The Portuguese party system includes both a sizeable Communist Party and a 
Social Democratic party which are both popular with the workers (see table 3.3). 
Given that hypothesis 3.1.1 is generally supported, the first part of hypothesis 3.1.2 is also, 
per definition, generally supported. In most countries the Socialist Left is less popular with 
the petite bourgeoisie than with the unskilled workers. However, the unskilled manual 
workers are in general not the second least prone to vote Socialist Left. The higher service 
class votes less for the Left Socialists than the unskilled workers do. For the skilled workers, 
the picture is mixed. In most Nordic and Western Central European countries, they are less 
likely to vote Left Socialist than the unskilled ones, contrary to hypothesis 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. In 
all Southern European countries except Greece, the voting pattern is in line with hypothesis 
3.1.2. 
Contrary to the second part of hypothesis 3.1.3, the routine non-manual employees also show 
a mixed picture. In the Nordic countries they vote similar to or more in favour of the Left 
Socialists than the skilled workers. In the Central West, the pattern is the opposite. In the 
South, the picture is mixed. Hypothesis 3.1.3 is thus not generally confirmed. 
The lower service class is the class that is most inclined to vote for the Left Socialist parties 
only in a few countries, contrary to hypothesis 3.1.4. However, the lower service class is 
consistently amongst the most ardent supporters of the Left Socialist party family. This could 
reduce traditional or overall left-right class voting, but not total class voting. The higher 
service class is divided. In some countries, they are most likely to vote LS, such as in Spain 
and Norway. In France and Sweden, they are least likely to vote LS.  
We also notice that there are considerable cross-national variations in the strength of class 
voting for the Socialist Left. We see that total LS class voting is particularly strong in 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal, and particularly weak in Germany, 
Iceland, Sweden, and France. Greece and Spain are in intermediate positions.  
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3.2 The Green Parties 
The Green parties were created in response to materialism and as a protest against the growth-
orientation of society (von Beyme 1985: 24). Their main concern is, obviously, the protection 
of the environment, but their agenda usually also contain other elements of post-materialism, 
such as an emphasis on participation, democracy, the right to privacy, women’s rights, and so 
on (von Beyme 1985: 130-131). The Global Greens, an organization with 91 Green parties as 
members across the globe, includes these themes in its 2012 Charter (GlobalGreens 2012).  
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
Green parties are part of the same New Politics category as the Left Socialist parties. In fact 
they could be seen as even more extreme “post-materialists” than the Left Socialists, as many 
of them share the view that material politics are no longer of fundamental importance, 
whereas the Left Socialists often emphasize their socialist views along the economic axis. 
Indeed, this has led observers such as von Beyme (1985: 131) to note that these parties do not 
seem to have any common class basis. He is sceptical of the claim that the new middle class 
will form the social basis of the Green parties. This is partly because he finds that it is difficult 
to position these parties along the economic axis, and that there is considerable cross-national 
variation in these parties orientations’ along this axis (von Beyme 1985: 132). He also notes 
that these parties have a tendency to gather some protest votes, blurring the social basis even 
more. Dolezal (2010: 536) claims that cleavages have not been seen as relevant for Green 
parties and that their “very existence has also been interpreted as an indicator of the overall 
decline of cleavage politics per se”, although he strongly contends this.  
We suspect that the new middle class will be somewhat more likely to vote Green than other 
classes. This includes the upper service class. High education gives them a certain post-
materialist value basis
15
, and since the Green parties are not necessarily socialist on the 
economic axis like the Left Socialists, the high income of the higher service class perhaps 
does not affect the Green vote. 
We develop the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.2.1: There will be no large differences between the classes. 
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 Although here we would benefit from the use of Oesch’s (2006) class schema to differentiate between groups 
within the service classes (see Dolezal 2010: 537-538). 
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Hypothesis 3.2.2: We expect the service classes (both higher and lower) to vote somewhat 
more in favour of the Greens than the other classes. 
3.2.2 The Class Basis of Green Parties in Western Europe 
Table 3.2: Support for Green parties in percent, according to class 
 
Hi serv. Lo serv. Rout nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Finland 18 21 18 3 5 15 16 0.78 
Sweden 7 12 13 7 1 7 10 0.80 
Ireland 3 10 7 0 1 2 5 - 
UK 7 10 9 10 5 10 9 0.25 
Austria 21 18 17 5 9 7 14 0.63 
Belgium 14 20 18 9 6 6 13 0.55 
Germany 12 15 13 9 9 6 11 0.35 
Luxembourg 14 22 18 14 11 12 16 0.29 
Netherlands 5 10 3 5 2 4 6 0.54 
Switzerland 14 19 15 0 11 5 14 - 
France 9 13 11 5 10 10 10 0.34 
Italy 2 3 3 0 1 2 2 - 
Mean 11 14 12 6 6 7 10  
 
Hypothesis 3.2.1 receives no support from the data. Even in the UK, the country with the 
smallest class differences, the Green party still has twice as much support amongst the lower 
service class (10%) as amongst the skilled workers (5%).  
Hypothesis 3.2.2 is supported, but needs some adjustment. The lower service class is in fact 
the most ardent supporters of the Green parties in ten of the twelve countries. This is in line 
with the findings of Dolezal (2010) in his analysis of 12 countries, although he utilizes a 
different class schema than ours. In Austria, this role is held by the higher service class, and in 
Sweden by the routine non-manual employees. The Green parties are thus clearly socially 
based in the service classes, notably the lower one. 
What we did not anticipate was that the routine non-manual employees would reveal 
themselves as the second most eager supporters of the Greens in eight of the twelve countries. 
The exceptions are the Netherlands, where the higher service class is second; Austria, where 
the lower service class is second; and of course Sweden where the routine non-manual 
employees are most Green of all the social classes. In addition, they are marginally below 
three other classes in the UK: 9% of the routine non-manual employees vote Green, whereas 
10% of the lower service class, petite bourgeoisie, and unskilled workers do the same.  
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The higher service class is third most likely to vote Green in nine out of twelve countries. The 
exceptions are the UK (7%); Austria (where it is most prone to vote Green); and France where 
the skilled and unskilled workers vote approximately as Green as the higher service class, 
while the lower service class and routine non-manuals are even Greener. 
The conclusion, contrary to the claims of von Beyme (1985), is that Green parties are indeed 
class based parties. We also notice the cross-national differences in class voting for Green 
parties. It is especially high in Finland and Sweden (>.70), and low in the UK, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and France (<.40). Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are in intermediate 
positions. 
3.3 The Social Democratic Parties 
The Social Democratic parties were the first parties to extend the political space in Western 
European party systems from the battle over the principles of the French revolution between 
the Conservatives and the Liberals, to the battle over the principles of economic (re-
)distribution – materialism (von Beyme 1985: 59-60). Although these parties often started off 
with a Marxist outlook, the conflict after the Russian Revolution split the Marxists off into 
Communist parties in many countries, thus moderating the Social Democratic parties (Brandal 
et al. 2013, von Beyme 1985). 
3.3.1 Hypotheses 
The Social Democratic parties used to be class parties par excellence. They originated as the 
representatives of the workers in the conflict between labour and capital and they are the only 
party family to be represented in all Western European countries (see Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). Knutsen (2006: 54) claims that “the parties that can be expected to be most strongly 
anchored in social classes are the parties based on the cleavages that sprang out of the 
Industrial Revolution”, and then suggests that these are the Communist, Social Democratic, 
and Liberal parties.  
Kitschelt places the workers in a centre-left position when it comes to economic policy. He 
does not differentiate between skilled and unskilled workers in this regard. He does, however, 
see the unskilled ones as somewhat more authoritarian (see figure 2.2). 
Where should we assume that the Social Democratic parties are placed in the two-dimensional 
political space? Originally, these were no doubt close to the socialist pole on the economic 
axis. Today, however, this depends on what strategy they chose when the political space 
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turned two-dimensional. According to Kitschelt (1994: 32-33), they would we well-advised to 
turn more libertarian and more economically right-wing, to keep the votes of the educated 
workers in internationally competitive manufacturing industries who no longer supports 
growth of the public sector. Arzheimer (2013: 78-79) claims that this has indeed happened in 
many cases. Von Beyme (1985: 75) also notes that the social democratic parties have changed 
their strategy and expanded their target group, becoming catch-all parties rather than 
appealing solely to workers. 
It is far from easy to theorize about the class basis of the Social Democrats. Many of these 
parties have, as mentioned, gone through important changes, like the British party which 
changed profoundly under Tony Blair. In addition, the political space has changed 
dramatically for many Social Democratic parties, with the rise of the “new worker parties”, 
namely the Radical Right (see section 3.8).  
And there is more to this party family than only the Downsian version of politics. The 
historical legacy cannot be dismissed, especially of the close ties between the trade unions and 
the social democrats (see for instance Brandal et al. 2013: chapter 1-4 for a historical 
overview). In spite of possible recent changes, the Social Democrats are likely to be seen as 
parties representing the economic interests of the workers against those of employers and 
owners. Although probably weaker than before, we hypothesise a linear relationship: The 
more the class is affiliated with the economic interests of workers, the more support for the 
labour parties. 
Thus we need to rank the classes on the basis of their economic interests. Goldthorpe and 
Mcknight (2006) discuss this issue based on three criteria: Economic security, economic 
stability, and economic prospects.  Economic security is measured as experience of 
unemployment: This is highest for the unskilled workers, then the skilled workers, then the 
three non-manual classes, and lowest for the petite bourgeoisie
16
 (Goldthorpe and McKnight 
2006: 113-114). Economic stability is measured by what kind of pay one receives. The pattern 
is similar: The classes characterised by a labour contract have less economic stability than 
those characterised by a service relationship. The exception is the petite bourgeoisie, which is 
marked by the most instability due its class position, earning their money through market 
transactions (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006: 116-121). Finally, the economic prospects are 
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 Although the authors specify that there are other sources of economic insecurity for the petty bourgeoisie 
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measured as the relationship between earnings and age. These show a similar ranking of the 
classes, although the position of the petite bourgeoisie is somewhat unclear due to 
methodological problems and underreporting of income (Goldthorpe and McKnight: 121-
129). Kitschelt suggests that the petite bourgeoisie are most right-oriented in economic 
questions (see figure 2.2).  Based on this information, we rank the classes as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.3.1: The classes will vote in the following rank (from highest to lowest 
probability of voting Social Democratic): 1) Unskilled workers; 2) skilled workers; 3) routine 
non-manual employees; 4) lower service class; 5) higher service class; 6) petite bourgeoisie.  
3.3.2 The Class Basis of the Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe 
Table 3.3: Support for the Social Democratic parties in percent, according to class 
 Hi serv. Lo 
serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Denmark 17 23 20 12 27 29 22 0.37 
Finland 10 19 26 2 40 24 19 1.19 
Iceland 35 25 25 14 32 23 26 0.40 
Norway 26 26 35 14 30 45 30 0,50 
Sweden 17 18 37 11 49 47 29 0,79 
Ireland 7 12 10 0 9 7 8 - 
UK 17 23 36 28 28 44 29 0.42 
Austria 27 21 33 25 40 50 33 0.44 
Belgium 16 19 18 14 38 40 24 0.56 
Germany 17 21 28 15 24 29 24 0.31 
Luxembourg 20 19 26 11 39 29 24 0.51 
Netherlands 11 15 18 7 22 26 16 0.50 
Switzerland 21 22 20 22 13 25 21 0.26 
France 26 26 34 9 31 32 28 0.54 
Greece 38 24 33 34 27 36 33 0.23 
Italy 32 39 33 30 30 29 33 0.15 
Portugal 11 38 36 24 44 40 37 0.64 
Spain 25 40 50 43 53 56 48 0.44 
Mean 21 24 29 18 32 34 27  
 
The hypothesis is by and large supported. The total mean shows the exact same order as 
hypothesised. The social democratic parties are most popular amongst the unskilled manual 
workers in most of the countries, and the skilled workers follow suit, although in some cases 
(most noteworthy Finland, Iceland, and Luxembourg) the order is reversed. In Ireland, the 
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Labour Party is second least popular amongst the unskilled workers, but then the Irish Labour 
Party is also a very special case (see for instance Orridge 1974; von Beyme 1985: 65). In 
Italy, the Partito Democratico (PD) is least popular amongst the unskilled workers, although 
they are only 1-2 percentage points behind the other groups except the low service class, with 
which the PD is most popular. 
The routine non-manual employees make up the third largest group of social democratic 
voters, as hypothesised. This holds true in most countries, although in some countries the 
Social Democrats are slightly more or slightly less popular with this group. For instance, in 
France, the Parti Socialiste is most popular with the routine non-manual employees, but only 
by two percentage points more than the unskilled workers and three more than the skilled 
ones. 
The service classes are generally second least prone to vote for the European labour parties. 
There is no large difference between the higher and lower service class in total, although the 
higher service class to a somewhat lesser degree votes in favour of labour parties, as 
hypothesised. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, there are rather large differences between the 
two classes (in Greece the PASOK are more popular amongst the higher than the lower 
service class). In Iceland, the Samfylkingin-Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands is most popular 
with the higher service class. 
The European labour parties are least popular with the petite bourgeoisie in total. This is also 
true in 11 of the 18 countries. However, in the UK, Spain and Portugal, the Social Democrats 
are even less popular with the higher service class. In Austria the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs (SPÔ) is least popular with the lower service class. In Switzerland, the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz has the support of approximately a fourth of all 
classes except the skilled workers, which for some reason avoid this party.
17
  
We note that total SD class voting is extremely high in the case of the Finnish Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (kappa >1). This is due to the fact that this party has extremely 
low support amongst the petite bourgeoisie (around 2%), whereas it ranges from 10-40% in 
the other groups.
18
 Total SD class voting is also relatively high in Sweden, Belgium, the 
                                                 
17
 Perhaps because they vote en masse for the Swiss radical right party, Schweizerische Volkspartei (see section 
3.8.2) 
18
 The Finnish petite bourgeoisie generally votes for the Radical Right (29%), the Agrarian party (26%) and the 
Conservatives (24%). 
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Netherlands, and Portugal. It is low in Denmark, the UK, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 
and extremely low in Greece and Italy (0.16 and 0.10).  
3.4 The Agrarian Parties 
The Agrarian parties were created in response to one of the two class cleavages, namely the 
conflict between producers and consumers in the commodity market. As mentioned, this 
cleavage has been integrated into existing parties in most Western European countries, but in 
all the Nordic countries independent Agrarian parties were established to protect the interests 
of the agrarian producers (Knutsen 2006: xi-xii). This was in part due to the fact that in these 
countries, there were important cultural barriers between rural and urban areas. This cultural 
conflict was added to the already bitter economic conflict, combining to make both conflicts 
worse (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 44-46).    
3.4.1 Hypotheses 
It is challenging to study the class basis of the Agrarian parties. First of all it is hard to 
distinguish the economic from the cultural conflict. Second, we would expect simply that the 
rural producers of agrarian products vote disproportionally in favour of these parties, while 
the urban consumers do not. In the EGP class schema, the producers would correspond to the 
farmers (here included in the petite bourgeoisie) and the agricultural workers (here part of the 
unskilled workers). The class schema was simplified this way to make possible the analysis of 
the other party families without getting too many empty cells. However, it distorts the 
analysis of the Agrarian parties. To remedy this, I have done the analyses also with the more 
extensive EGP class schema, but the results are merely commented on here, not analysed 
fully. Future research should focus on separate analysis of this party family with a suitable 
class schema.  
As the Agrarian parties are clearly representatives of the interests of a very particular group, 
namely the rural producers of agricultural products, we expect these to vote Agrarian. The 
industrial areas are often concentrated near or in the cities, and so are the workplaces related 
to higher education and finance. We thus expect the workers and middle classes to be mostly 
urban, with the exception of the unskilled workers, because they include the agricultural 
workers. In the countries with Agrarian parties, there are a total of 717 people in the 
“unskilled worker” category. Of these, about 10% are farm labourers. We derive the 
following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3.4.1: The petite bourgeoisie is most likely to vote Agrarian 
Hypothesis 3.4.2: The unskilled workers will also vote somewhat more in favour of the 
Agrarian parties than the rest of the classes, except the petite bourgeoisie 
3.4.2 The Class Basis of the Agrarian Parties 
Table 3.4: Support for the Agrarian parties in percent, according to class   
 
Hi serv. Lo serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Denmark 35 27 24 59 27 24 30 0.53 
Finland 10 14 12 39 5 14 14 0.72 
Iceland 5 11 16 20 15 19 13 0.51 
Norway 2 7 5 29 6 10 7 0.88 
Sweden 5 4 2 15 3 4 4 0.66 
Mean 11 12 12 32 11 14 14  
 
Hypothesis 3.4.1 is strongly supported. The petite bourgeoisie is most likely to vote Agrarian 
in all countries, with a great margin everywhere but Iceland. This is mostly due to the farmers, 
although the Agrarian parties are popular also with the other parts of the petite bourgeoisie. 
When we separate the farmers from the petite bourgeoisie, we get the pattern in table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Support for the Agrarian parties among petite bourgeoisie and farmers, in percent  
 
Petite 
bourg. 
Farmers 
Denmark 50 71 
Finland 28 59 
Iceland 20 26 
Norway 13 60 
Sweden 6 45 
Mean 23 52 
 
The largest difference between the two classes is in Sweden, where very few of the petite 
bourgeoisie vote for Centern (6%), whereas almost half the farmers vote for this party.  
Hypothesis 3.4.2 is supported by the data in Finland, Iceland, and Norway, where the 
unskilled workers are second most likely to vote Agrarian. In Sweden, they are about as likely 
as the other classes (4%) except the petite bourgeoisie which is about three times as likely to 
vote Agrarian (15%). In Denmark, 24% of the unskilled workers vote Agrarian, compared 
with 24-35% for the other classes. The Agrarian party family may thus contribute to reduce 
traditional and overall left-right class voting somewhat, at least in three countries, as the 
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unskilled workers vote slightly in favour of this party family which is normally considered as 
part of the “Right”.  
Total Agrarian class voting is especially strong in Norway, notably because of the large 
difference between the petite bourgeoisie (29%) and the other classes (2-10%). Total Agrarian 
class voting is also rather strong in Sweden, for the same reason (15% versus 2-5%), and 
Finland (39% vs 5-14%). It is moderate in Iceland, but rather weak in Denmark, in spite of the 
fact that an impressive six out of ten petty bourgeois vote Agrarian. This is because Venstre is 
rather popular in all classes, with support ranging from 24% amongst the unskilled workers to 
35% amongst the higher service class.   
3.5 The Liberal Parties 
The Liberal parties of today have their roots in the liberalism and radicalism of the 18
th
 
century, leading back to the conflict with the old regimes over the values of the French 
Revolution (von Beyme 1985: 31-35). Together with the Conservative parties, these were 
usually the earliest parties to form.  
3.5.1 Hypotheses 
Liberalism is, and has always been, connected to the protection of the bourgeois concept of 
private property. At the same time, liberals have been engaged in the support of human and 
civil rights, pluralism and regionalism, education policy and social liberalism (von Beyme 
1985: 36-39). Today, other post-materialist values such as environmental protection and 
personal privacy have become important for liberal parties. We position the Liberal party 
family as a right-libertarian party family – right-leaning on the economic axis, libertarian on 
the cultural axis. Von Beyme (1985: 44-45) discussed the loss of middle class monopoly and 
the erosion of the Liberals’ social basis due to the decline of the old middle class, but he 
predicted (rather correctly; see the next subsection) that the new middle class gradually would 
replace the old as the social basis of the Liberal parties. 
Due to the new focus on some post-materialist issues, it could be that the service classes will 
vote disproportionally in favour of the Liberals. In addition, Knutsen (2006: 54) identifies the 
Liberal party family as the strongest defender of the capitalists in the conflict between labour 
and capital. We hypothesize the opposite pattern of the Social Democrats: the more the class 
is tied to capitalist economic interests, the more popular the Liberals will be with the class 
(see section 3.3.1 for a discussion of how the class interests were derived).  
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Hypothesis 3.5.1: The classes will vote in the following rank (from highest to lowest 
probability of voting Liberal): 1) petite bourgeoisie; 2) higher service class; 3) lower service 
class; 4) routine non-manual employees; 5) skilled workers; 6) unskilled workers.  
3.5.2 The Class Basis of the Liberal Parties in Western Europe 
Table 3.6: Support for the Liberal parties in percent, according to class 
 
Hi 
serv. 
Lo serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Denmark 11 11 5 1 5 1 7 0.96 
Norway 9 7 6 1 4 3 6 0.64 
Sweden 17 11 7 4 3 2 9 0.83 
UK 22 15 13 5 16 12 15 0.52 
Austria 5 7 5 0 0 1 4 - 
Belgium 26 15 18 34 12 11 17 0.51 
Germany 14 14 8 20 8 5 10 0.52 
Luxembourg 26 15 15 22 22 22 19 0.26 
Netherlands 22 15 12 26 18 5 16 0.58 
Switzerland 25 20 19 19 9 12 19 0.43 
France 16 18 16 20 12 6 15 0.46 
Portugal 25 22 31 27 27 40 31 0.27 
Mean 18 14 13 15 11 10 14  
 
The hypothesis is generally confirmed, with one exception. Comparing the total mean, we see 
that the higher service class is even more supportive of the Liberals than the petite bourgeoisie 
(18% vs 15%). This is true in seven of the twelve countries, whereas the classes are more 
equal in the remaining five.  
This is partly due to the fact that the farmers, who are economically right-wing and culturally 
authoritarian, are not particularly prone to vote Liberal (this was confirmed by analysing the 
class basis with farmers separated from the petite bourgeoisie). The other classes are in 
general ranked as hypothesised.  
Breaking it down by country, the Liberals are most popular within the higher service class or 
the petite bourgeoisie in all countries except Austria and Portugal. The lower service class is 
most prone to vote for the Austrian Liberales Forum, whereas it is surprisingly the unskilled 
workers who vote most for the Partido Social Democrata. This is, however, a somewhat 
special version of a Liberal party, which its name also suggests. Note also that in the UK and 
in Norway, the petite bourgeoisie is least likely to vote Liberal.  
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The unskilled workers act as hypothesised in 7 out of 12 countries, and in three of the 
remaining five countries they are the second least likely to vote Liberal. In the UK and 
Norway, this is due to the aforementioned voting of the petite bourgeoisie. In Luxembourg, 
both the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees are less likely to vote 
Liberal than the unskilled workers. In Switzerland, the skilled workers have a lower log odds 
ratio than the unskilled ones. The last country is Portugal. 
The skilled workers are less prone to vote Liberal than the unskilled in all countries except 
Luxembourg (equal proportions), Switzerland, and Portugal. They are less likely to vote 
Liberal than the rest of the classes in all countries except Norway and the UK (as mentioned), 
the Netherlands and Portugal. In the Netherlands, both the lower service class and the routine 
non-manual employees are less likely to vote Liberal than the skilled workers.   
Total Liberal class voting is by far most widespread in the Nordic countries. This is because 
the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers almost never vote for this party family (1-
4%), whereas the service classes often do (7-17%). Total Liberal class voting is very low in 
Portugal and Luxembourg, while it is at a moderate level for the rest of the Liberal parties.  
3.6 The Christian Democratic Parties 
Religious parties were often formed as a part of the counter-reaction to Liberal or secular 
legislation in the 19
th
 century, especially related to education. However, they did not turn into 
mass parties until after the Second World War. Today, they vary from the Protestant parties in 
Scandinavia to the Catholic ones in Belgium and Austria (von Beyme 1985: 81-85).  
3.6.1 Hypotheses 
The Christian Democratic parties see themselves as somewhat outside the two political axes, 
and they are generally against the class war. Compared to the pre-war religious parties, the 
Christian Democratic parties established after the Second World War were cross-confessional, 
i.e. no longer strictly Catholic, and thus increased their cross-class appeal. They also 
incorporated a number of central, shared values in the time after the war, like support for 
human rights, anti-communism, and democracy. In addition, they want to even out the 
differences between the social classes: “More than other parties, the Christian Democrats 
stress that they are catch-all parties” (von Beyme 1985: 93). Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 
(2010: 187) explain that the need to incorporate diverse class interests within the parties also 
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created a successful appeal across classes and sectors outside the parties, and that the CD 
parties have emphasized religion at the expense of class. 
Knutsen (2006: 55-56) also emphasizes their cross-class appeal, although he suggests that 
they may enjoy more support in the rural parts of the population due to their more 
conservative stances in several cultural issues, and because the rural population usually is 
more religious than the urban. This is mostly relevant to the petite bourgeoisie (which 
includes farmers) and the unskilled workers (which include agricultural workers).  
Hypothesis 3.6.1: We expect no great differences between the classes. 
Hypothesis 3.6.2: The petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers will be somewhat more 
prone to vote Christian Democratic than the other classes.  
3.6.2 The Class Basis of Christian Democratic parties  
Table 3.7: Support for the Christian Democratic parties in percent, according to class 
 
Hi 
serv. 
Lo 
serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. 
Total Kappa 
Finland 3 3 3 0 0 1 2 - 
Norway 4 5 12 1 4 3 6 0.69 
Sweden 4 6 2 2 0 6 4 - 
Ireland 24 27 25 32 22 14 23 0.33 
Austria 31 23 20 42 18 22 24 0.40 
Belgium 22 27 24 30 25 23 25 0.14 
Germany 41 37 39 43 39 38 39 0.09 
Luxembourg 28 30 29 42 13 23 27 0.48 
Netherlands 21 17 21 34 16 28 21 0.34 
Switzerland 15 10 14 17 10 15 13 0.34 
Italy 13 11 12 8 9 7 10 0.24 
Mean 19 18 18 23 14 16 18  
  
As we see, hypothesis 3.6.1 is supported by the data. The CDU/CSU in Germany is the most 
extreme case of a cross-class Christian Democratic party: Its support ranges from 37% in the 
lower service class to 43% in the petite bourgeoisie, and the kappa value is merely 0.09.  
There are no large differences between the classes, as indicated by the low kappa values. The 
only notable exception is the Norwegian Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) with its kappa of 0.66. 
This is due to the routine non-manuals voting disproportionally in favour of the KrF (12%), at 
the same time that the petite bourgeoisie does not vote for the KrF (1%). The other classes 
vary from 3-5%.  
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In Luxembourg, the Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei also has a somewhat higher kappa 
value than the others, namely 0.36. This is mainly caused by the great support amongst the 
petite bourgeoisie (42%) and the low support amongst the skilled workers (13%). The other 
classes vary from 23-30%.  
Hypothesis 3.6.2 also gets some support, but only for a limited area. The petite bourgeoisie is 
the most likely to vote Christian Democratic in all countries in Central Western Europe 
(which counts six out of ten relevant countries). In the Nordic countries, however, it is 
amongst the rarest supporters of Christian Democracy – perhaps because the Nordic countries 
have Agrarian parties, which the farmers largely flock to. This idea is strengthened by the fact 
that when analysing farmers separately from the petite bourgeoisie, the Christian Democratic 
support amongst the petite bourgeoisie falls drastically in Central Western Europe, but not in 
the Nordic countries.
19
 The low petite bourgeoisie support for CD parties in the Nordic 
countries could also be due to the fact that these parties are more left-wing than their 
Continental counterparts (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 188). The hypothesis does not 
seem to hold when it comes to the unskilled workers. 
3.7 The Conservative parties 
Conservative parties were amongst the first to develop, usually as a defensive response to 
Liberal parties. Although they have gone through considerable ideological changes, they still 
share scepticism to rapid change and faith in traditional values. What have changed, however, 
are their economic policies – these have become more or less neoliberal since the 1970s. We 
may thus describe these parties as right-authoritarian in general, which is also what Kitschelt 
(1994; 1995) suggests.    
3.7.1 Hypotheses 
The shift in economic policy is partly due to the changing class basis of the Conservative 
parties. While originally existing for the nobility and clergy, they have become increasingly 
popular amongst the upper middle classes and even in some parts of the working class (von 
Beyme 1985: 46-51). However, with the strong emphasis on neoliberalism as some of the old 
Liberal parties moved towards social-liberal positions, we expect the Conservatives to be “the 
parties for the bourgeoisie and the upper-middle class” (Knutsen 2006: 55; see also von 
                                                 
19
 In fact, between 26 (Iceland) and 71 (Denmark) percent of the farmers in our sample vote Agrarian in the 
Nordic countries, and only 0-4% vote Christian Democratic. On the other hand, around 70% of the farmers in all 
Central Western European countries vote Christian Democratic (except in Switzerland, where only 17% do so).  
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Beyme 1985: 50-52), and inversely, the nemesis of the working class – along the economic 
axis. Given the former discussion of the economic interests of the classes, this also implies 
that the petite bourgeoisie may vote disproportionally in favour of this party family.  
The value axis, however, complicates the picture. First of all, there is some considerable 
variation between the parties in this regard (the Norwegian Conservatives, for instance, 
describe themselves as both conservative and liberal, see Høyre 2014). Also, whether workers 
will vote for this party family or not, given that they share their somewhat authoritarian 
outlook but not their economic policies, depends on whether the economic axis or the value 
axis is most important. Here, we will assume that Old Politics are still more important than 
New Politics for Conservative voting, and thus that the workers will not vote Conservative. 
The petite bourgeoisie, sharing both the economic and value outlook of the Conservatives, 
will vote disproportionally in favour of this party family.  
Hypothesis 3.7.1: The higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie will be most likely to 
vote Conservative 
Hypothesis 3.7.2: The workers (of all sorts) will be least likely to vote Conservative  
Hypothesis 3.7.3: The lower service class will be in a middle position between the workers on 
the one hand and the higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie on the other 
3.7.2 The Class Basis of Conservative Parties 
Table 3.8: Support for Conservative parties in percent, according to class 
 
Hi 
serv. Lo serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petite 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. Total Kappa 
Denmark 15 7 5 16 6 4 8 0.60 
Finland 45 35 21 24 11 8 29 0.76 
Iceland 39 26 29 37 21 27 30 0.31 
Norway 29 24 12 15 11 5 18 0.67 
Sweden 43 35 20 46 17 11 28 0.71 
Ireland 47 31 41 34 41 45 40 0.23 
UK 47 43 36 38 36 22 38 0.37 
France 34 22 18 41 16 14 22 0.54 
Greece 30 22 26 38 35 27 31 0.27 
Italy 27 21 19 31 26 32 26 0.25 
Portugal 18 0 4 6 0 0 2 - 
Spain 46 31 27 42 31 22 30 0.37 
Mean 35 25 22 31 21 18 25  
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Hypothesis 3.7.1 is supported. It holds in seven out of 12 countries. The exceptions are 
Finland, Norway, and the UK, where the lower service class is more likely to vote 
Conservative than the petite bourgeoisie. In addition, the unskilled workers are about as prone 
to vote Il Popolo della Libertà as the petite bourgeoisie is. Ireland is, as usual, different from 
the other countries. Here the Conservative party is least popular amongst the lower service 
class and the petite bourgeoisie.   
Hypothesis 3.7.2 is also strongly supported. In seven out of 12 countries, the unskilled, 
skilled, and routine non manual employees are less likely than the other classes to vote 
Conservative. In Iceland, Greece, and Portugal, the lower service class is least likely to vote 
Conservative. In Italy, Il Popolo della Libertà (PdL), a somewhat untypical Conservative 
group, is actually relatively popular with both the skilled and unskilled workers. 
Hypothesis 3.7.3 receives much less support. The lower service class does only take this 
middle position in Denmark, Sweden, France, and Spain. 
Total Conservative class voting is especially important in the Nordic countries (except 
Iceland), and to some degree in France. It is lower in the other countries, especially in Ireland 
with a kappa value of only 0.14. 
3.8 The Radical Right Parties 
The Radical Right party family (from now on: RR) is perhaps the most studied party family, 
which explains why this subsection is somewhat longer and more theoretically sophisticated 
than the others. The RR is one of the main reasons as to why we need to stop measuring party 
choice as left versus right. As Rydgren (2013: 1-3) writes, the RR has started changing its 
economic policy from neo-liberal to centre or even leftist policies, but the main reason that 
workers vote for the RR is that they agree with its socio-cultural rightist policies – i.e. its 
stances in questions such as immigration and authoritarianism (see Kitschelt 2013).  
3.8.1 Hypotheses 
The RR is often labelled the “new worker parties”. In the literature we find several theoretical 
arguments of why this is so. One kind of explanation is economic. Workers tend to be the 
“losers” (economically speaking) of modernization and globalization due to both increased 
economic competition domestically from immigrants (over jobs and social services), and due 
to increased competition internationally from countries with lower labour costs. Thus they 
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tend to vote in favour of parties which are against both immigration and globalization – i.e. 
the RR (see Betz and Meret 2013: 109-111; Oskarson and Demker 2013: 175; Oesch 2008). 
A second kind of explanation is cultural. Due to low education, workers are claimed to lack 
the cognitive development necessary to prevent generalizations and scapegoating; to lack the 
teaching of communicative interaction skills and the socialization of specific norms related to 
avoiding prejudices, and so on. Hence they are more prone to have authoritarian values and to 
feel threatened by foreign cultures, and thus vote for anti-immigrant and authoritarian parties 
like the RR (Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013: 126, 131; Coffé 2013: 138; Oesch 2008). This 
should also mean that unskilled workers are even more likely than skilled workers to vote for 
the RR, as they have lower education and are more directly exposed to the economic 
competition of immigrants. Based on these theoretical arguments, we deduce the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.8.1: Workers will vote disproportionally in favour of the RR 
Hypothesis 3.8.2: Unskilled workers will vote more in favour of the RR than skilled workers  
Based on the theoretical arguments above, we may infer that the highly educated or high 
income groups will show the opposite tendency. The middle classes are winners of 
globalization – especially the sociocultural specialists – and thus not likely to vote for the RR 
(Bornschier and Kriesi 2013: 17). 
Hypothesis 3.8.3: The RR will be least popular amongst the service classes. 
According to Kitschelt (2013: 230-232), there is no reason to distinguish between manual and 
non-manual labour, as these groups are performing analytically similar tasks. It has also been 
noted that the routine non-manual employees are similar to manual workers in their low 
salary, absence of career structure, low workplace autonomy, and so on (Evans 2005). Thus 
one might think that they will vote like the manual workers. However, they are less exposed 
to competition from immigrants and/or economic competition from developing countries. 
This goes in particular for the ones employed in the public sector. We therefore hypothesise a 
middle position for the routine non-manual employees. 
Hypothesis 3.8.4: The routine non-manual employees will vote more in favour of the RR than 
the service classes, but less so than the workers.    
The small business owners are also somewhere in between: They are characterized by a lack 
of education, but they are not bad off in terms of income and they have a certain preference 
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for laissez-faire economic policies, and thus face no trade-offs in voting for the radical right 
(unless it keeps moving to the left in economic questions). Bornschier and Kriesi (2013: 17) 
predict that many potential supporters of the RR are to be found within this class. Farmers, 
with their typically low education and rural conservatism in matters of culture and values, 
may also be supporters of this party family (Kitschelt 1994: 26). Thus: 
Hypothesis 3.8.5: The petite bourgeoisie will vote more in favour of the RR than the service 
classes, but less so than the working classes. 
3.8.2 The Class Basis of the Radical Right in Western Europe 
Table 3.9: Support for the Radical Right parties in percent, according to class 
 
Hi 
serv. 
Lo 
serv. 
Rout 
nman. 
Petit 
bourg. 
Skilled 
work. 
Unskilled 
work. Total Kappa 
Denmark 4 4 8 8 18 20 9 0.69 
Finland 5 6 12 23 18 19 11 0.64 
Norway 17 19 20 33 40 24 22 0.42 
Austria 12 26 21 23 30 16 21 0.39 
Belgium 4 3 8 6 12 9 6 0.50 
Germany 1 1 2 0 6 6 3 - 
Luxembourg 2 2 5 8 5 4 4 0.61 
Netherlands 4 2 3 3 7 3 3 0.35 
Switzerland 17 15 24 33 39 31 22 0.46 
France 1 2 2 3 2 8 3 0.78 
Greece 1 5 4 3 7 8 4 0.66 
Italy 6 1 0 7 0 0 2 - 
Mean 6 7 9 12 15 12 9  
 
In general, hypotheses 3.8.1, 3.8.3, 3.8.4 and in 3.8.5 receive support from the data, whereas 
3.8.2 does not. The workers vote disproportionally in favour of the RR – in fact, the skilled 
workers are the most eager supporters of these parties. Thus the second hypothesis does not 
receive support – the unskilled workers only vote more in favour of the RR than the skilled 
ones in Denmark, Finland, and France.  
Unsurprisingly, the service classes are the least eager supporter of the RR. This holds true in 
all countries except the Netherlands, where the party is tiny (3 %). As we see, the RR is 
second most popular amongst the petite bourgeoisie, and is basically at the level of the 
workers – in other words, even more prone to voting RR than hypothesised.  
In sum, we see important differences between the classes in their propensity to vote for 
Radical Right parties. Interestingly, these differences seem to have the same base in most 
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countries. For instance, the RR is least popular in the service class everywhere but Italy; 
usually with the higher service class being most reluctant to vote for them. The working class 
and the petite bourgeoisie together form the core electorate of the radical right in all countries 
except Germany, France and Italy. The electorates of the three German RR parties and the 
French Front National are comprised almost solely of workers. The Italian RR is based on a 
surprising alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the higher service class. 
Total Radical Right class voting is especially important in Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg 
and France. It is least important in Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands. 
A main point to take from this subchapter is that the West European Radical Right is clearly a 
class-based party family, with the petite bourgeoisie and the workers as its core electorate. As 
this differs from the other categories of non-socialist party families, the fourth generation 
party choice variable seems to be needed for a more nuanced understanding of class voting.   
3.9 Conclusion: How strong is the class basis? 
The kappa measure introduced in section 2.3.1 has been used throughout this chapter to 
measure how strong class voting is for each party – how much the classes vary in their voting. 
In this subsection, we will comment on the fuller picture by showing the difference in class 
voting by party family instead of showing the difference in class voting by national parties 
within a party family.  
In table 3.10, two measures are included. First, the mean of the kappa values for each 
individual party within a party family. This tells us how strong total party family specific 
class voting is, as a whole. Second, we show a kappa value calculated with the mean total 
support for the party family in each class. This indicates to what degree the party family 
specific class basis is the same in all countries. That explains why the latter is consistently 
lower than the former. Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical party family with only two 
parties, which are both highly class based. Party A has strong support in the service classes 
and amongst the routine non-manual employees and party B has an equally strong support in 
the working classes and the petite bourgeoisie. In this case, both parties would have a high 
kappa value, yielding a high mean of the two kappas. However, the mean support of the party 
family would yield a lower kappa value, as this party family could now seem to be 
approximately equally supported by all classes.   
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We believe that the parties that were created as part of the two class cleavages will have a 
stronger class basis than the other parties – i.e. the Agrarian parties, the Social Democrats, and 
the Liberals. Parties based on cleavages that cross the class cleavage, like the Christian 
Democrats, are expected to show the weakest class voting.  
The results should ideally be compared to former studies, but as this is amongst the first 
comparative analyses of total party family specific class voting ever undertaken, there is not 
much to compare to. Knutsen (2006:66-68) analysed total party family specific class voting 
with the mean kappa value as a measure. However, his analysis used a somewhat different 
class schema, was longitudinal (covering the time period 1975-1997), and included only eight 
of the eighteen countries studied here. It is thus not evident that the results are comparable. At 
the very least, it means that where our findings diverge from his, there are at least three 
possible interpretations. First, that the total party family specific class voting was different in 
2008 and in the period 1975-1997; second, that it was different in the ten countries not 
included in Knutsen’s analysis; and third, that it is different due to the use of somewhat 
different class schemas. 
Knutsen (2006: 67) found that the old class parties, i.e. the Communists, Social Democrats, 
and the Liberals, were most firmly anchored in social classes. He found that the New Politics 
parties (the Green, the LS, and the RR) were class based, but to a much lower degree than the 
old class parties. He also found that the Christian Democrats were not very class based. Table 
3.10 displays the results from our own analysis.  
[Table 3.10 here] 
As hypothesised, the Christian Democrats contribute least to class voting, independent of 
what kappa measure we are considering. This is in line with Knutsen’s (2006: 67) results. It is 
more surprising that the Social Democrats and the Conservatives appear to be comparatively 
little class based – especially the Social Democrats were believed to have a strong class basis. 
Only the Christian Democrats have a lower mean kappa value than these two, whereas only 
the Christian Democrats and the Liberals have a lower kappa based on mean support.  
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Table 3.10: Kappa values for each party family
20
, ranked by mean of kappas (high to low) 
Party Family Mean of kappas Kappa based on mean 
support 
Agrarians 0.66 0.47 
Left Socialists 0.60 0.31 
Radical Right 0.55 0.36 
Liberals 0.54 0.22 
Greens 0.50 0.39 
Social Democrats 0.49 0.32 
Conservatives 0.46 0.31 
Christian Democrats 0.33 0.18 
 
The Agrarian parties, representing the producer pole of the agrarian class cleavage, are in the 
top, as expected. This is true for both kappa measures. The Liberals are almost as class based 
as the Radical Right, based on the mean of the kappa values – in line with both our theoretical 
expectations and Knutsen’s (2006) empirical findings. However, their kappa based on mean 
support is less than half of the first measure – only 0.22. The only party family with a lower 
kappa based on mean support are the Christian Democrats. This means that the Liberal parties 
do have a firm anchoring in social classes, but in different social classes in different countries. 
Even with the mean of the kappa values, the Liberal parties are just slightly more class based 
than the Greens. This post-materialist party family, deemed to have no particular class basis 
(von Beyme 1985: 131), appears to be quite class based indeed. In fact, the Green party 
family has the second highest kappa based on mean support, meaning that these parties have 
one of the most consistent class bases in all countries. While not in line with our theoretical 
expectations or the findings of Knutsen, this is in line with Dolezal’s (2010) empirical 
findings.    
It is especially interesting to note the top three, and compare this result to the following 
statement: “The rise of the New Left in the 1980s and the Radical Right in the 1990s has been 
widely interpreted as the demise of class politics” (Oesch 2013: 31). Oesch was right to 
                                                 
20
 Parties with empty cells are excluded from the calculation, as no kappa value could be obtained. These are 
limited to the Left Socialists in Norway and Luxembourg; the Greens in Ireland, Switzerland, and Italy; the 
Liberals in Austria; the Christian Democrats in Finland and Sweden; the Conservatives in Portugal; and the 
Radical Right in Germany and Italy. 
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contend this view. Although the Left Socialist parties have different class bases in different 
countries, as is noticeable when comparing the mean of the kappas to the kappa based on 
mean support, the Left Socialist and the Radical Right are both amongst the party families 
that contribute most to class voting as measured by the mean of the kappas. As we saw in 
section 3.1.2 and 3.8.2, this is partly due to workers voting disproportionally for the Radical 
Right and “against” the Left Socialist parties; and due to the service classes voting the 
opposite way. We want to underline that this reduces traditional and overall left-right class 
voting, but not total class voting, which is the most valid measure. The need for fourth 
generation class voting studies is obvious.  
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Chapter 4: Class Voting and Value Orientations 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is divided into subchapters for the party families. 
Although chapter 2 gave a thorough summary of what we will do in this chapter, a brief 
reminder is called for. 
For each subchapter, we will first show the bivariate relationship between social class and 
party family specific voting (model 1). This will show us whether the classes vote 
significantly different from each other – recall that no significance tests were performed in 
chapter 3. All the social classes will be compared to the unskilled workers, who are chosen as 
the reference group. We will calculate a gross kappa value based on the coefficients of the 
social classes, i.e. the log odds ratios (cf. chapter 2). We will also visualize the results by 
plotting the predicted probabilities of voting for the party family for each class. 
We will then attempt to learn more about how class and voting are related and how this 
relationship varies between party families. We will control for the value orientations 
discussed in chapter 2 and see how this changes the coefficients of the classes (and thus the 
kappa value); in other words, how this affects the party family specific class voting (models 
2-6). We remind the reader that the value orientations are centered around their mean. Hence 
the intercept is interpreted as the log odds of an unskilled worker with a mean value on the 
relevant value orientation voting for the specific party family. 
Finally, we will control for all the value orientations at the same time (model 7). We can then 
calculate kappa values based on the coefficients and see how they change for each model. 
This will give us a measure of how much total party family specific class voting the value 
orientations account for. In other words, the more the kappa value is reduced, the more of the 
differences between the classes are accounted for by the five value dimensions – although, as 
specified in chapter 2, there is not a linear relationship between reductions in total party 
family specific class voting and reductions in class differences. 
The results will be evaluated relative to some hypotheses we develop in each subchapter. 
These will generally be based on the theoretical parts of chapter 3. Some models will be 
visualized by plotting the predicted probabilities, which will be compared to the plot of the 
first model. The choice of which models to visualize is made by considering the relevance of 
the model to the developed hypotheses. 
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4.1 Value orientations and Left Socialist class voting 
In section 3.1 we labelled the Left Socialist parties as post-materialistic. Our hypotheses were 
based in part on assuming how the classes related to issues like the environment, immigration, 
and libertarianism. LS parties have a clear New Politics profile, related to environmental 
protection; ecological concern; promotion of minority rights and feminism; promotion of 
libertarian values, and so on (Zilliacus 2001: 34). Kitschelt described these parties as extreme 
libertarians along the value axis. There is thus reason to believe that New Politics values, 
related to immigration, libertarianism, and environmental protection, will be more important 
in accounting for class differences than Old Politics values. As these parties are especially 
regarded to be libertarian (see for instance Knutsen 1995: 163, Zilliacus 2001: 34), we 
believe that this value orientation will account for most class voting of the ones regarded here. 
We develop the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.1.1: The New Politics value orientations will be more important in accounting 
for total LS class voting than the Old Politics value dimensions. 
Hypothesis 4.1.2: The libertarian-authoritarian value orientation will be most important in 
this regard. 
The results from the analysis of LS voting are shown in table 4.1. Model 1 shows the bivariate 
relationship between class and LS voting. We note that the petite bourgeoisie is significantly 
different (at the 1%-level) from the unskilled workers, as expected. There is no difference 
between the skilled and unskilled workers. The other differences are not significant at any 
reasonable level. Figure 4.1 visualizes these results by plotting the predicted probabilities of 
voting LS for each class. The figure reveals the small differences between the classes, with 
the petite bourgeoisie differing somewhat from the rest.
21
 While this may be surprising given 
the high mean kappa value for this party family, it merely reflects the fact that the Left 
Socialists have somewhat different class bases in the different countries. For instance, the 
Irish Sinn Fein is highly popular with the working class, and unpopular with the service class, 
whereas the Spanish Izquierda Unida shows the opposite pattern. The results mimic those of 
the mean support for the party family in section 3.1, which for instance was 10% for both the 
skilled and unskilled workers.  
 
                                                 
21
 Note that the y-scale goes from 0-0.1 in the figure, not to 1. 
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Table 4.1: Left Socialist voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher -0.19 0.15 -0.29
*
 -0.22 -0.41
***
 -0.39
***
 -0.27
*
 
service class (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
        
Lower 0.06 0.21
*
 0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 
service class (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
        
Routine 0.10 0.21
*
 0.13 0.06 -0.06 -0.00 0.05 
non-manual (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
        
Petite -0.81
***
 -0.49
**
 -0.79
***
 -0.83
***
 -0.84
***
 -0.85
***
 -0.52
**
 
bourgeoisie  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
        
Skilled -0.00 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 
workers (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  0.46
***
     0.41
***
 
ideology  (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   -0.15
***
    -0.12
***
 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    0.20
***
   0.14
***
 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     0.21
***
  0.09
***
 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      0.19
***
 0.12
***
 
orientations      (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Intercept -2.37
***
 -2.73
***
 -2.42
***
 -2.38
***
 -2.33
***
 -2.39
***
 -2.69
***
 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) 
        
Intercept 0.479 0.625 0.485 0.555 0.406 0.547 0.671 
variance (0.192) (0.247) (0.194) (0.221) (0.164) (0.218) (0.265) 
N 12014 12014 12014 12014 12014 12014 12014 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
We also note the country level residual variance of 0.479. This is the variance of the intercept, 
i.e. the variance of the log odds of voting Social Democratic for the unskilled workers. It is 
hard to interpret in and of itself as it is the variance of a log odds (LEMMA 2014a), but we 
will return to it when we compare models later. 
Table 4.2 portrays the kappa values based on the models in table 4.1. For models 2-7, the 
absolute and relative change from the kappa value from model 1 is shown. We see that the 
class coefficients from the bivariate model 1 yield a kappa value of 0.31. As expected, this is 
similar (in fact, it is identical) to the kappa based on mean support in section 3.9.  
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Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of voting Socialist Left, by class 
 
Table 4.2: The kappa values from the Left Socialist voting models
22
 
  Kappa Absolute change Relative change 
Model 1: Class only 0.31 - - 
Model 2: Class and economic ideology 0.16 -0.16 -50 % 
Model 3: Class and religiosity 0.31 -0.01 -2 % 
Model 4: Class and environmental values 0.31 0.00 -1 % 
Model 5: Class and libertarianism 0.29 -0.02 -6 % 
Model 6: Class and immigration orientations 0.31 0.00 0 % 
Model 7: Class and all value orientations 0.20 -0.12 -37 % 
 
Model 2 controls for economic ideology. The more left-leaning voters are more likely to vote 
LS than the right-leaning voters. It is highly interesting to notice that the class coefficients 
have changed dramatically. Notably, table 4.1 shows that the coefficient of the petite 
bourgeoisie is halved. The kappa value is reduced by 50%, to 0.16, as we can see in table 4.2. 
This means that when controlling for economic ideology, only half of the total LS class voting 
remains. The difference between the unskilled workers on the one hand, and the lower service 
class and the routine non-manual employees on the other, has increased and is now 
significant.
23
 At the same time, the level 2 variance has increased to 0.625. This could for 
instance be due to the classes having different ideologies in different countries, and this could 
be correlated with the popularity of the LS parties in the mentioned countries.
 24
 It should, 
                                                 
22
 Rounded to the second decimal, which is why some of the relative changes might not correspond perfectly to 
the absolute ones. 
23
 This is only the case in one of the four alternative specifications. 
24
 The variance increases in four of the five remaining models, although less dramatically. This will not be 
commented upon as the interpretation remains the same. 
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however, be duly noted that changes in level 2 variance must be interpreted with a solid dose 
of caution in multilevel logistic regression (see LEMMA 2014b). Therefore, such changes 
will be observed and sometimes commented upon, but not given much weight. 
Model 3 controls for religiosity, which is negatively associated with voting LS. The only class 
coefficient that undergoes noteworthy change is that of the higher service class, which is now 
significantly different from the unskilled workers.
25
 The kappa value remains almost the 
same. 
Model 4 controls for environmental values. Predictably, voters whom are more preoccupied 
with preserving the environment also vote more often for the LS parties, in line with New 
Politics theory. Contrary to hypothesis 4.1.1, however, controlling for environmental values 
does not account for any of the differences between the classes. No coefficients are 
substantially changed, and the kappa value thus remains the same.  
Model 5 controls for libertarianism, which as expected is positively related to voting LS. 
Otherwise it looks like model 3: Stable kappa values and no important change in coefficients 
except for the higher service class. This is highly surprising and contrary to both of our 
hypotheses. There is, however, a reduction of about 15% in the level 2 variance,
26
 indicating 
that the different distribution of libertarianism in the different countries may account for some 
of the between-country differences in LS voting.    
Model 6 controls for immigration orientations. Positive attitudes are connected to an increase 
in LS voting. Otherwise it is similar to model 3. Again this is contrary to hypothesis 4.1.1.  
Model 7 includes all the value orientations. There are no important changes in their 
coefficients other than that of libertarianism, which is halved. Compared to model 1, the 
difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers are reduced, whereas the 
difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers increased. The kappa 
value is reduced by 37% percent, implying that direct LS class voting is 37% lower than total 
LS class voting. In other words, the value orientations account for 37% of the total LS class 
voting.  
                                                 
25
 This is also only the case in one of the four alternative specifications. 
26
 This is calculated by subtracting the level 2 variance in the relevant model from the level 2 variance in the 
model only accounting for class (model 1), and dividing it by the level 2 variance in model 1 (0.479-0.406 /0.479 
≈ 0.152). 
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It may seem counter-intuitive that economic ideology alone (model 2, 50%) accounts for 
more total LS class voting than including all the value orientations at the same time (model 7, 
37%). Here, controlling for economic ideology reduces the difference between the petite 
bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers at the same time that it is increasing the difference 
between the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees. Thus, these log odds 
ratios are closer to the mean of the coefficients, meaning that the kappa – the standard 
deviation of the coefficients – is heavily reduced. The last model, however, only reduces the 
difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers (there is no significant 
difference between the two other mentioned classes and the unskilled workers), reducing the 
kappa to a lesser extent. 
In sum, LS voting is class based, although the class basis differs between countries: In some 
countries, the LS parties are worker parties; in others, they are most popular with the service 
classes. This could be due to the profile and history of the party. To what degree have former 
Communist parties been able to successfully change into New Politics parties? It could also 
be connected to issues of political space. Some parties are facing competition over the worker 
vote by Social Democratic and/or Communist parties, while others are facing competition 
over the service class vote from Green parties. 
The value orientations account for about 37% of the total LS class voting, but surprisingly the 
most important value orientation was economic left-right views, connected to Old Politics. 
None of our hypotheses received support from the analysis. To visualize these findings, figure 
4.2 and 4.3 plots the predicted probabilities of voting LS for each class given their, 
respectively, economic ideology and libertarianism (with all other variables held at their 
observed values).
27
 These are chosen to show the unexpected high importance of economic 
ideology and vice versa for libertarianism, compared to our hypotheses. 
Figure 4.2 shows that there are important variations in the differences between the classes at 
different levels of economic ideology, where the right-wing voters almost never vote LS 
regardless of class, whereas notably the petite bourgeoisie and the higher service class vote 
less LS than the other most left-oriented voters. Figure 4.3 shows, in contrast, that the 
difference between the classes is rather similar at all levels of libertarianism. 
                                                 
27
 They were also plotted with all other variables held at their mean; this did not affect the plot much. 
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Figure 4.2 may give the impression of an interaction effect – it may seem like the effect of 
class is larger at more leftist economic views. There is, however, no interaction. The 
transformed variables increase linearly, but given the logarithmic transformation, this yields a 
non-linear increase in the predicted probabilities. Thus the higher the “original” predicted 
probability of voting LS for a class, the more it will increase as economic ideology becomes 
more leftist.  
 
Figure 4.2: Predicted probability of voting LS by class and economic ideology 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Predicted probability of voting LS by class and authoritarian-libertarian values 
 
59 
 
4.2 Value orientations and Green class voting 
In section 3.2, the Green parties were discussed as extreme post-materialists with 
environmental protection as their raison d’être (see also Dolezal 2010: 541). We expect the 
economic growth versus environmental protection value orientation to account for most class 
voting. Although we found that the Green parties did have a class basis in the service classes, 
we also emphasized that the Green parties sometimes deny the relevance of materialist issues 
altogether. Green leaders have often claimed that they are standing outside of the traditional 
political division between left and right (Dolezal 2010: 537). At the same time, they take a 
clear pro-immigration and pro-libertarian stance (Dolezal 2010: 542). In other words, there is 
reason to believe that there are other issues than the material ones that create the class 
differences in Green voting. We thus expect the value orientations connected to New Politics 
to be more important than the ones connected to Old Politics. We develop the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.2.1: The New Politics value orientations will be more important in accounting 
for total Green class voting than the Old Politics value dimensions. 
Hypothesis 4.2.2: The environmental value orientation will be most important (of the ones 
considered here) in accounting for total Green class voting 
The analysis of Green voting is displayed in table 4.3. Model 1 shows the bivariate 
relationship between class and Green voting. First, there are no significant differences 
between the petite bourgeoisie, the skilled workers and the unskilled workers. Second, we 
note that the higher service class, lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees 
do differ significantly from the unskilled workers. The ranking of the classes is similar to the 
one discovered in section 3.2. Table 4.4 displays the kappa values from the models. The 
kappa value from model 1 is 0.38. This is again, as expected, highly similar to the one 
displayed in section 3.9, namely 0.39.  
[Table 4.3 here] 
Model 2 controls for economic ideology. It is interesting to note that being leftist in economic 
ideology is positively related to voting Green. This is in contrast to the claims of scholars such 
as Talshir (2002: 12) that the question of economic redistribution or control over means of 
production does not matter at all for Green politics (see Dolezal 2010: 541). However, unlike 
the case for the Left Socialists, economic ideology seems to account for very little of the class 
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differences in Green voting. There is basically no change in the kappa value. The coefficients 
of the three classes that did differ from the unskilled workers are slightly increased, whereas 
that of the petite bourgeoisie is slightly reduced. Model 3 tells us that being religious is 
weakly, negatively associated with Green voting. Controlling for religiosity has practically no 
impact on the class coefficients or the kappa values. As such it is unimportant in explaining 
class differences, although it does account for some 13% of the between-country variance in 
Green voting.  
Table 4.3: Green voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher 0.49
***
 0.64
***
 0.45
***
 0.40
**
 0.22 0.26
*
 0.07 
service class (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
        
Lower 0.86
***
 0.95
***
 0.83
***
 0.73
***
 0.63
***
 0.69
***
 0.47
***
 
service class (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
        
Routine 0.65
***
 0.70
***
 0.67
***
 0.57
***
 0.48
***
 0.59
***
 0.44
***
 
non-manual (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Petite -0.17 -0.01 -0.16 -0.21 -0.24 -0.13 -0.18 
bourgeoisie (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
        
Skilled 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 
workers (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  0.16
***
     0.07
**
 
Ideology  (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   -0.09
***
    -0.06
***
 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    0.36
***
   0.33
***
 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     0.23
***
  0.12
***
 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      0.26
***
 0.22
***
 
orientation       (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Intercept -2.74
***
 -2.83
***
 -2.75
***
 -2.77
***
 -2.68
***
 -2.80
***
 -2.80
***
 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) 
        
Intercept 0.331
*
 0.326
*
 0.288
**
 0.263
**
 0.310
**
 0.386
*
 0.285
**
 
variance  (0.149) (0.147) (0.130) (0.122) (0.139) (0.172) (0.132) 
N 10797 10797 10797 10797 10797 10797 10797 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.4: Kappa values from the Green voting models 
  
Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0,38 - - 
Model 2 0,39 0,01 2 % 
Model 3 0,38 0,00 -1 % 
Model 4 0,34 -0,04 -10 % 
Model 5 0,31 -0,08 -20 % 
Model 6 0,30 -0,08 -21 % 
Model 7 0,25 -0,14 -36 % 
 
Model 4 adds environmental values to social class. Obviously enough, caring for the 
environment is positively, even most positively, linked to Green voting. Different 
distributions of environmental values in the different countries account for about 20% of the 
between-country variance in Green voting. However, it only accounts for a small portion of 
the class differences. The net kappa value after controlling for environmental values is about 
10% lower than the gross kappa value, i.e. the total Green class voting, and the coefficients 
are slightly changed. In sum, environmental values are very important for Green voting, but 
not for accounting for class differences, contrary to hypothesis 4.2.2. It is still more important 
than the Old Politics cleavages, strengthening hypothesis 4.2.1. 
Model 5 controls for libertarianism, which is positively related to Green voting. Controlling 
for this variable renders the difference between the higher service class and the unskilled 
workers halved and non-significant. The differences between the lower service class and the 
routine-non manual employees, on the one hand, and the unskilled workers on the other, are 
reduced. Total class voting as measured by the kappa value is reduced with 20%, thus 
accounting for twice as much class voting as environmental values. This gives support to 
hypothesis 4.2.1, whereas hypothesis 4.2.2 is disconfirmed. 
Model 6 includes immigration orientations, and being more positive to immigration increases 
the chance of voting Green. Controlling for this variable also reduces the between-country 
variance. The class coefficients are reduced
28
 and the kappa value is reduced by more than 
20%. The conclusion is the same as for model 5: hypothesis 4.2.1 is supported, while 4.2.2 is 
disconfirmed. 
The final model includes all variables. The difference between the higher service class and the 
unskilled workers is rendered non-significant and with almost no magnitude. The log odds 
                                                 
28
 In the four alternative specifications, the coefficient of the higher service class is even rendered non-significant 
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ratio of the lower service class is halved; that of the routine non-manual employees reduced 
by a third. The kappa value is reduced by 36%. In addition, although less important, the 
economic ideology and libertarianism coefficients are approximately halved.
29
  
In conclusion, the value orientations account for about 36% of the total Green class voting. 
The Old Politics values were of almost no importance in this regard, whereas the New 
Politics-orientations mattered. This was as expected, and hypothesis 4.2.1 was greatly 
supported. However, it was surprising to see that libertarianism and immigration orientations 
were more important in accounting for class differences than were environmental values. 
Hypothesis 4.2.2 was disconfirmed.
30
  
Visualizing these findings, figure 4.4 plots the predicted probabilities from model 3 of voting 
Green for each class, by religiosity levels. There are two things to note: The Old Politics 
dimension religiosity has no strong impact on the likelihood of voting Green (although we see 
that the most religious people are somewhat less likely to do so). Also, the class differences 
do not vary much by level of religiosity (although the classes are somewhat more 
homogenous at the higher religiosity levels). 
[Figure 4.4 here] 
Compare this to figure 4.5, plotting the predicted probabilities of voting Green by class and 
environmental values. These are obviously important, and the differences between the classes 
vary from barely existent (at low levels of environmentalism) to highly salient (at high levels 
of environmentalism). These plots are meant to visualize the support our analysis gave to 
hypothesis 4.2.1; namely that the New Politics value orientations would account for more 
class voting than the Old Politics value orientations. 
[Figure 4.5 here] 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 In the four alternative models, some coefficients are significant at a less strict level than here. 
30
 A closer analysis revealed why: The classes do in fact not differ greatly in their environmental values. 
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Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of voting Green by class and religiosity 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Predicted prob. of voting Green by class and environmental values 
 
 
4.3 Value orientations and Social Democratic class voting 
In section 3.3, we mentioned that the Social Democratic parties are amongst the old class 
parties, created as part of the class cleavage that developed with the Industrial Revolution. We 
theoretically justified our hypothesis about the likelihood that the different classes would vote 
SD by discussing the classes’ economic interests. These were measured by their economic 
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security, economic stability, and economic prospects. We now assume that these interests will 
affect economic ideology.  Our hypothesis in this chapter is then as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.3.1: The most important factor (of the ones considered here) accounting for 
total SD class voting will be economic ideology. 
The results from the analysis of SD voting are shown in table 4.5. Model 1 shows the 
bivariate relationship between class and SD voting. As we see, all the classes differ 
significantly from the unskilled workers at the 0.1% level when it comes to SD voting, except 
for the skilled workers whose difference is significant at the 5% level.
31
 The ranking of the 
classes is similar to the one found in section 3.3.2.  
[Table 4.5 here] 
Table 4.6 portrays the kappa values based on the models. We see that the class coefficients 
from the bivariate model 1 yield a kappa value of 0.30 – compared to 0.32 in section 3.9.   
[Table 4.6 here] 
Model 2 controls for economic ideology. Unsurprisingly, the more left-leaning voters are 
more likely to vote SD than the right-leaning voters. It is more interesting to notice that the 
class coefficients have changed. The kappa value is reduced by 20%, to 0.24. The skilled 
workers no longer significantly differ from the unskilled ones. Different distributions of 
economic values in the countries also account for some 10% of the between-country variance 
in SD voting. 
Model 3, 4 and 5 controls for, respectively, religious beliefs, environmental values, and 
libertarianism. We see that being religious is weakly, negatively associated with voting SD. 
The two other coefficients are not significant at any reasonable level and have no magnitude 
to speak of.  None of these three value orientations account for any between-country variance 
and none of them change the kappa values. In all three models, the difference between the 
skilled and unskilled voters remains significant. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 The results are similar in the alternative specifications, except that the difference between the unskilled and 
skilled workers is only significant at the 10%-level in the gllamm and logit models (this is true for model 3, 4 
and 5 as well). 
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Table 4.5: Social Democratic voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher -0.71
***
 -0.55
***
 -0.73
***
 -0.71
***
 -0.72
***
 -0.84
***
 -0.64
***
 
service class (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
        
Lower -0.57
***
 -0.49
***
 -0.58
***
 -0.56
***
 -0.57
***
 -0.67
***
 -0.55
***
 
service class (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
        
Routine -0.30
***
 -0.27
***
 -0.30
***
 -0.30
***
 -0.30
***
 -0.36
***
 -0.28
***
 
non-manual (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
        
Petite -0.82
***
 -0.66
***
 -0.82
***
 -0.82
***
 -0.82
***
 -0.83
***
 -0.66
***
 
bourgeoisie (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
        
Skilled -0.14
*
 -0.11 -0.16
*
 -0.14
*
 -0.14
*
 -0.13 -0.10 
workers (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  0.23
***
     0.22
***
 
ideology  (0.01)     (0.01) 
        
Religious   -0.03
***
    -0.03
***
 
beliefs   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    -0.01   -0.04
**
 
values    (0.01)   (0.01) 
        
Libertarianism     0.01  -0.04
***
 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
        
Immigration      0.11
***
 0.10
***
 
orientations      (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Intercept -0.63
***
 -0.72
***
 -0.63
***
 -0.64
***
 -0.63
***
 -0.60
***
 -0.71
***
 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
        
Intercept 0.21
***
 0.19
***
 0.21
***
 0.21
***
 0.21
***
 0.20
***
 0.18
***
 
variance (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 15609 15609 15609 15609 15609 15609 15609 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Model 6 controls for attitudes towards immigrants. Being more positive to immigration 
increases the log odds of voting SD. Immigration orientations account for some between-
country variance and, in fact, increase the kappa value by 10%, notably because the service 
classes now differ more from the workers.  
Model 7 includes all the value variables. It accounts for some 14% of the between-country 
variance and reduces the kappa value by 13%. The difference between skilled and unskilled 
voters is rendered non-significant in both model 6 and 7. Again it might seem counter-
intuitive that controlling for all value orientations (model 7) reduces class voting by less than 
when controlling only for economic ideology (model 2). This might be due to the fact that 
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immigration orientations, which are included in model 7, actually were masking class 
differences. 
Table 4.6: The kappa values from the Social Democratic voting models 
  
Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0.30 - - 
Model 2 0.24 -0.06 -20 % 
Model 3 0.30 0.00 0 % 
Model 4 0.30 0.00 0 % 
Model 5 0.30 0.00 1 % 
Model 6 0.33 0.03 10 % 
Model 7 0.26 -0.04 -13 % 
 
To visualize the results, figure 4.6 plots the predicted probabilities from model 1. We see that, 
for instance, the unskilled workers (probability ≈ .35) are 84% more likely to vote SD than the 
petite bourgeoisie (probability ≈ .19). 
Figure 4.6: Predicted probability of voting Social Democratic by class 
 
In figure 4.7 we have plotted the predicted probabilities of voting SD for each class by 
economic ideology, i.e. the predictions from model 2. The goal is to visualize the reduction in 
the class differences: These are smaller at each ideological level compared to the differences 
in figure 4.6. Amongst the most right-leaning voters, the predicted probability of voting SD is 
about 63% higher for the unskilled workers than for the petite bourgeoisie, compared to 84% 
in the predictions from model 1. Amongst the most left-leaning, the same distance is only 
about 36% (0.60/0.44).     
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Figure 4.7: Predicted probability of voting Social Democratic by class and economic 
ideology 
 
In conclusion, the full model reduces direct SD class voting with about 13% compared to total 
SD class voting. It is also clear that differences in economic ideology are by far most 
important in accounting for differences in SD voting between the classes; in fact, controlling 
for this variable alone reduced total SD class voting by a fifth. Immigration orientations seem 
to matter as well, whereas libertarianism, environmental values and religious beliefs are less 
important in accounting for between-class differences.  
4.4 Value orientations and Agrarian class voting 
In section 3.4, we emphasized the cultural and economic conflict between rural and urban 
areas, producers and consumers of agricultural products. Still, it is not obvious that economic 
ideology will reduce class voting in this case. The variable is mainly concerned with the role 
of the state in the economy and in redistribution between individuals. We suspect that the 
petite bourgeoisie might be against this form of redistribution, at the same time as they are in 
favour of redistribution to the rural industry through subsidies to agriculture. This is 
untestable with our variables. However, if economic ideology explains any class differences 
here, we suspect it will be due to the petite bourgeoisie being economically right-wing, rather 
than having agricultural interests. 
On the other hand, parts of the cultural conflict might be traceable in our variables. Torben 
Worre (1980: 308-309) claims that the farmers “…constitute a rural subculture more 
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influenced by tradition and religion than the urban one.” Our religiosity variable is an obvious 
choice to measure the effect of religion. Tradition may be traced in our libertarianism and 
immigration orientations variables. Taken together, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 4.4.1: Religiosity will account for total Agrarian class voting 
Hypothesis 4.4.2: Libertarianism and immigration orientations will account for total 
Agrarian class voting 
Table 4.7: Agrarian voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher -0.02 -0.29 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.10 -0.14 
service class (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
        
Lower 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.08 
service class (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
        
Routine -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 
non-manual (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
        
Petite 1.30
***
 1.04
***
 1.28
***
 1.27
***
 1.32
***
 1.32
***
 1.03
***
 
bourgeoisie  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
        
Skilled -0.11 -0.21 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 
workers (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  -0.28
***
     -0.25
***
 
ideology   (0.03)     (0.03) 
        
Religiosity   0.07
***
    0.07
***
 
   (0.02)    (0.02) 
        
Environmental    -0.15
***
   -0.10
**
 
values    (0.03)   (0.03) 
        
Libertarianism     -0.12
***
  -0.06
*
 
     (0.03)  (0.03) 
        
Immigration      -0.11
***
 -0.06
*
 
attitudes      (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Intercept -2.14
***
 -2.12
***
 -2.16
***
 -2.16
***
 -2.24
***
 -2.23
***
 -2.25
***
 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) 
        
Intercept 0.550 0.593 0.549 0.603 0.534 0.565 0.612 
variance (0.356) (0.385) (0.355) (0.390) (0.346) (0.366) (0.396) 
N 4261 4261 4261 4261 4261 4261 4261 
 
Model 1 shows that the small differences we saw between the classes in section 3.4 are not 
significant, except from the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled 
workers, which is large and highly significant (this is true when comparing the petite 
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bourgeoisie to any of the other class as well). The results are visualized in figure 4.8. We also 
note the kappa value of 0.51 (compared to 0.47 in section 3.9), confirming the strong class 
basis these parties have in the petite bourgeoisie. 
Table 4.8: Kappa values from the Agrarian models 
  Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0.51 - - 
Model 2 0.45 -0.06 -11 % 
Model 3 0.50 -0.01 -2 % 
Model 4 0.49 -0.01 -3 % 
Model 5 0.49 -0.02 -4 % 
Model 6 0.49 -0.01 -2 % 
Model 7 0.41 -0.09 -18 % 
 
Figure 4.8: Predicted probabilities of voting Agrarian, by class 
 
Controlling for economic ideology in model 2, which as expected is negatively associated 
with Agrarian voting, we see that the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the other 
classes is somewhat reduced. The kappa value decreases by 11%. As mentioned, we believe 
that this is due to the petite bourgeoisie’s right-wing stance in economic issues not related to 
agricultural subsidies. 
While religiosity is positively related to Agrarian voting, as expected, it is surprisingly and 
contrary to hypothesis 4.4.1 not accounting for Agrarian class voting. The coefficients and the 
kappa value remain more or less the same in model 3. Hypothesis 4.4.2 is also disconfirmed: 
While libertarianism and positive attitudes towards immigration are negatively associated 
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with Agrarian voting, neither account for any class differences. The same is true for 
environmental values. The full model confirms these findings. 
 
Figure 4.9: Predicted probabilities of voting Agrarian, by class and religiosity 
 
We may conclude, contrary to what we expected, that the petite bourgeoisie does not vote 
more Agrarian than the other classes due to its religiosity, authoritarianism or resistance to 
immigration. Figure 4.9 displays visually that hypothesis 4.4.1 is disconfirmed: No matter 
what level of religiosity the respondents are at, the class differences remain basically the 
same. Perhaps this would look different if our class schema were more detailed and 
distinguished between the farmers and the rest of the petite bourgeoisie, or between the 
agricultural workers and the unskilled ones, which one could have done in a separate analysis 
of this party family. In any case, future research should look into the attitudes towards 
agricultural economic value orientations as a way to explain class differences in Agrarian 
voting. Agricultural economic ideology is something apart from economic left-right ideology, 
which we examined here. 
4.5 Value orientations and Liberal class voting  
In section 3.5, we described the Liberal party family as the strongest defender of capitalist 
interests in the conflict between labour and capital, and suggested an opposite class pattern of 
the Social Democrats, due to economic ideology. However, we also classified these parties as 
right-libertarian and occupied with some post-materialist issues. Many of these are related to 
liberalism in the broad term. Building on the discussion in chapter 3, it is natural to 
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hypothesise that economic ideology will account for most total Liberal class voting. Also, we 
would expect that the New Politics value dimensions are of a certain importance. We land on 
the two following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.5.1: The most important value orientation accounting for total Liberal class 
voting will be economic ideology. 
Hypothesis 4.5.2: The New Politics value orientations will also matter, especially 
libertarianism. 
The findings from analysing Liberal voting are shown in table 4.9. Model 1 shows that the 
higher service class is most likely to vote Liberal, followed by the petite bourgeoisie and the 
lower service class. The routine non-manual employees follow suit. The skilled workers do 
not differ significantly from the unskilled ones. The ranking is the same as found in section 
3.5.2. The kappa value from this model is reported to be 0.30 in table 4.10, somewhat higher 
than the 0.22 found in section 3.9.  
[Table 4.9 here] 
Model 2 shows us that being economically left-wing reduces the chance of voting Liberal, as 
expected. It also reduces the difference between the higher service class and the unskilled 
workers, and between the petite bourgeoisie and the workers. The kappa value is reduced by 
20%, as portrayed in table 4.10. This is in support of hypothesis 4.5.1. 
Model 3, 4, and 5 are highly interesting: It seems that religiosity levels, environmental values 
and even libertarianism do not affect Liberal voting at all. The coefficients are non-significant 
and with pathetic magnitudes. In addition, neither of these three value orientations account for 
class differences. Neither the class coefficients nor the kappa values are changed to any 
notable degree. Model 6 shows that positive attitudes towards immigrants are positively 
related to Liberal voting, but controlling for this variable does not account for much of the 
class differences. There are some slight changes in the class coefficients, yielding a 4% 
reduction in the kappa. Hypothesis 4.5.2 is disconfirmed. The final model summarizes what 
we have seen in the other models. The kappa value is reduced somewhat more than in model 
2, now by 30%.  
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Table 4.9: Liberal voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression
32
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher 0.88
***
 0.72
***
 0.87
***
 0.89
***
 0.86
***
 0.85
***
 0.63
***
 
service class (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
        
Lower 0.56
***
 0.48
***
 0.55
***
 0.57
***
 0.53
***
 0.53
***
 0.41
***
 
service class (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
        
Routine 0.33
**
 0.32
**
 0.33
**
 0.34
***
 0.32
**
 0.32
**
 0.28
**
 
non-manual (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
        
Petite 0.58
***
 0.39
**
 0.58
***
 0.58
***
 0.58
***
 0.58
***
 0.37
**
 
bourgeoisie (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
        
Skilled 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.07 
workers (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  -0.20
***
     -0.21
***
 
Ideology  (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   -0.01    -0.01 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    -0.03   -0.02 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     0.02  0.03 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      0.03
*
 0.05
**
 
orientations      (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Intercept -2.42
***
 -2.41
***
 -2.42
***
 -2.43
***
 -2.41
***
 -2.41
***
 -2.38
***
 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
        
Intercept 0.473 0.500 0.483 0.479 0.496 0.466 0.533 
variance (0.200) (0.211) (0.204) (0.203) (0.210) (0.197) (0.225) 
N 11502 11502 11502 11502 11502 11502 11502 
Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The alternative models yield similar results, although many coefficients are somewhat closer to zero. At the 
same time, the standard errors are increased in many of the models. Thus quite a few of the coefficients are 
rendered non-significant, especially in the robust logit models. The results from all of the 28 alternative 
specifications are available upon request.  
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Table 4.10: Kappa values from the Liberal voting models 
  
Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0.30 - - 
Model 2 0.24 -0.06 -20 % 
Model 3 0.30 0.00 -1 % 
Model 4 0.30 0.00 0 % 
Model 5 0.30 -0.01 -2 % 
Model 6 0.29 -0.01 -4 % 
Model 7 0.21 -0.09 -30 % 
 
The bivariate relationship is visualized in figure 4.10. The class differences are moderate: The 
higher service class has a more than twice as high chance of voting Liberal than the unskilled 
workers.  
Figure 4.10: Predicted probability of voting Liberal, by class 
 
 
In figure 4.11 we see that economic ideology matters for Liberal voting, and that it accounts 
for some of these class differences. For the most right-wing voters, the probability of voting 
Liberal is about 60% higher for the higher service class than for the unskilled workers, 
compared to over 100% in figure 4.10. For the most left-wing voters, the class differences are 
negligible.    
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Figure 4.11: Predicted probability of voting Liberal by class and economic ideology 
 
4.6: Value orientations and Christian Democratic class voting 
In section 3.6, we emphasized the cross-class appeal of the Christian Democrats, which might 
in part be due to the religious cleavage cross-cutting the class cleavage. In that case, rather 
than accounting for the class differences, religiosity should account for class similarities: The 
voters may vote in line with their religious identity rather than their class identity. In other 
words, workers and routine non-manual employees, who are more religious than the service 
classes, will vote CD to a larger extent than their class interests imply. On the other hand, the 
service classes, whom are most secular, will vote CD to a lesser extent than their class 
interests imply.
33
 Thus the distance between the classes will be rather small. However, when 
controlling for religiosity, this distance should increase. 
Also, we mentioned that the petite bourgeoisie might tend to vote for this party family due to, 
for instance, its conservative stances in cultural issues and its relatively high religiosity levels. 
If this is the case, then: 
Hypothesis 4.6.1: The class differences will increase when controlling for religiosity 
Hypothesis 4.6.2: The difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the other classes should 
decrease when controlling for libertarianism 
                                                 
33
 In our data, the classes rank in the following order from secular to religious: Higher service class; lower 
service class; skilled workers; routine non-manual employees; unskilled workers; petite bourgeoisie.  
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The results of the analysis are displayed in table 4.9. Model 1 is evidence of what we 
suspected: The class differences are small. The kappa value is only 0.18, identical to the one 
we found in section 3.9. Even more impressive, only the petite bourgeoisie is significantly 
different from the unskilled workers.
34
 In model 2, we see that some of this difference is 
accounted for by economic ideology, as the coefficient of the petite bourgeoisie is reduced 
and significant at a less strict level. The kappa value is reduced by 19%. As expected, being 
left-wing is negatively associated with CD voting. The results are visualized in figure 4.12. 
Model 3 controls for religiosity, which is of course positively related to CD voting. The kappa 
value is only raised by 3%, which is in line with hypothesis 4.6.1, although it is a smaller 
increase than expected. However, the kappa value does not distinguish between significant 
and non-significant coefficients. It is crucial to notice that both the higher and the lower 
service class now have almost doubled their coefficients and these have become significant at 
the 5% and 1%-level, respectively. This supports the hypothesis.  
Controlling for environmental values (model 4), which are negatively associated with voting 
CD, changes little except that the higher service class is now significantly different from the 
unskilled workers at the 5%-level.  
Model 5 includes libertarianism, which naturally is negatively associated with CD voting. 
Quite contrary to hypothesis 4.6.2, no reduction in the petite bourgeoisie coefficient is 
observed. In fact, the coefficients of the higher and lower service class, and even the routine 
non-manual employees, increase and turn significant, at the 1% and 0.1%-level. The kappa 
value increases with 12%, and the level 2 variance is reduced with some 10%. This means 
that the higher and lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees, differ from the 
workers at the same level of libertarianism, but that they have a different distribution of 
libertarianism which conceals this. This is confirmed upon closer analysis: The three classes 
mentioned have the highest libertarian values of all, whereas the workers are closer to the 
authoritarian pole. Still, hypothesis 4.6.2 is disconfirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 This is true also for the gllamm models. In the robust logit model, not even the petite bourgeoisie differ 
significantly from the unskilled workers. 
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Table 4.11: Christian Democratic voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic 
regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher 0.17 0.06 0.32
**
 0.22
*
 0.38
***
 0.23
*
 0.43
***
 
service class (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
        
Lower 0.11 0.05 0.21
*
 0.18 0.29
**
 0.16 0.34
***
 
service class (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
        
Routine 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.25
**
 0.14 0.21
*
 
non-manual (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
        
Petite 0.49
***
 0.37
**
 0.54
***
 0.51
***
 0.53
***
 0.49
***
 0.50
***
 
bourgeoisie
35
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
        
Skilled -0.09 -0.11 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 
workers (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  -0.12
***
     -0.09
***
 
ideology   (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   0.24
***
    0.23
***
 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    -0.14
***
   -0.13
***
 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     -0.19
***
  -0.11
***
 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      -0.06
***
 -0.03
*
 
orientations      (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Intercept -1.94
***
 -1.91
***
 -2.21
***
 -1.99
***
 -2.09
***
 -1.97
***
 -2.33
***
 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) 
        
Intercept 0.883 0.898 0.971 0.891 0.787 0.863 0.937 
variance (0.386) (0.393) (0.424) (0.390) (0.345) (0.378) (0.409) 
N 9658 9658 9658 9658 9658 9658 9658 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Model 6 shows that being positive to immigrants and immigration is weakly, negatively 
associated with CD voting. It does not affect class voting much: The kappa value is stable and 
the coefficients change little, although the higher service class now differ significantly from 
the unskilled workers at the 5%-level. The final model controls for all variables. This has 
approximately the same effect as controlling for religiosity or libertarianism alone: The 
coefficients of the higher and lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees, turn 
                                                 
35
 The petite bourgeoisie does not differ significantly from the unskilled workers in the robust logit model. In the 
gllamm models, they are usually similar to the ones displayed here. 
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significant. Otherwise there is little change, as shown by the tiny 3% increase in the kappa 
value. 
Table 4.12: The kappa values from the Christian Democratic voting models 
  Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0.18 - - 
Model 2 0.15 -0.04 -19 % 
Model 3 0.19 0.01 3 % 
Model 4 0.19 0.01 3 % 
Model 5 0.20 0.02 12 % 
Model 6 0.18 0.00 1 % 
Model 7 0.19 0.01 3 % 
 
Figure 4.12: Predicted probabilities of voting Christian Democratic, by class 
 
 
To illustrate the small difference between total and direct CD class voting, figure 4.13 shows 
the predicted probabilities of voting CD, by class, from model 7. As we see, this is highly 
similar to the predicted probabilities from model 1 in figure 4.12, although notably the petite 
bourgeoisie is slightly closer to the other classes. 
 
Summing up, CD voting is not very class based. This seems to be in part due to the religious 
cleavage cross-cutting the class cleavage, and due to different distributions of libertarianism 
in the classes. The small class differences we did see in model 1 were partly accounted for by 
economic ideology.  
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Figure 4.13: Predicted probabilities of voting Christian Democratic, by class 
 
4.7: Value orientations and Conservative class voting 
In section 3.7 we took note of the Conservative parties’ scepticism to rapid change and faith 
in traditional values. We also emphasized their passage to neo-liberal economic policies since 
the 1970s. We concluded that Old Politics would still be more important than New Politics. 
We thus expect economic ideology to account for most class differences. However, we also 
expect that the classes will differ in libertarianism, and that this will account for some class 
differences in Conservative voting due to these parties’ focus on traditional values. 
Hypothesis 4.7.1: Economic ideology will account for most total Conservative class voting 
Hypothesis 4.7.2: Libertarianism will account for some total Conservative class voting 
Table 4.13 displays the result. In model 1 we see that there are rather important class 
differences, symbolized by the kappa value of 0.35 (compared to 0.31 in section 3.9) 
displayed in table 4.14. The ranking of the classes is the same as in section 3.7.2. 
[Table 4.13 here] 
Model 2 shows that being left-wing in economic issues is strongly and negatively associated 
with Conservative voting. It also lends strong support to hypothesis 4.7.1: All coefficients are 
reduced, some drastically. The difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no 
longer significant. The kappa value is reduced by a third.  
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Table 4.13: Conservative voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression
36
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher 0.98
***
 0.68
***
 1.01
***
 1.01
***
 1.15
***
 1.17
***
 0.96
***
 
service class (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
        
Lower 0.48
***
 0.33
***
 0.51
***
 0.53
***
 0.65
***
 0.64
***
 0.57
***
 
service class (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
        
Routine 0.22
*
 0.19
*
 0.21
*
 0.25
**
 0.34
***
 0.30
***
 0.31
***
 
non-manual (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
        
Petite 0.83
***
 0.51
***
 0.83
***
 0.84
***
 0.86
***
 0.85
***
 0.55
***
 
bourgeoisie (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
        
Skilled 0.22
*
 0.14 0.25
*
 0.22
*
 0.27
*
 0.20 0.17 
workers (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  -0.47
***
     -0.45
***
 
ideology  (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   0.06
***
    0.05
***
 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    -0.15
***
   -0.09
***
 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     -0.16
***
  -0.09
***
 
     (0.01)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      -0.16
***
 -0.11
***
 
orientations      (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Intercept -1.71
***
 -1.74
***
 -1.72
***
 -1.74
***
 -1.81
***
 -1.80
***
 -1.89
***
 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) 
        
Intercept 0.739 0.932 0.726 0.739 0.772 0.686 0.869 
variance (0.319) (0.396) (0.314) (0.319) (0.334) (0.297) (0.372) 
N 9805 9805 9805 9805 9805 9805 9805 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
The third and fourth model controls for religiosity and environmental values. Being more 
religious is positively related to Conservative voting, unlike environmental values. However, 
these value orientations do not account for class differences. The coefficients and the kappa 
values remain more or less the same. 
The fifth model controls for libertarianism, which as expected is negatively associated with 
Conservative voting. Contrary to hypothesis 4.7.2, it does not account for class differences. In 
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 The results are similar in the alternative specifications, although some coefficients are not significant or 
significant at a lower level. 
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fact, it was masking class differences: The coefficients are larger compared to model 1, and 
the kappa value increased by 10%. This might be for the same reason that class differences in 
CD voting increased when controlling for religiosity. The service classes are the most 
libertarian classes, which might make them less inclined to vote Conservative than their class 
interests imply. Nevertheless, hypothesis 4.7.2 is disconfirmed.   
Model 6 includes a control for immigration orientations. Being positive to immigration is 
negatively related to voting Conservative. Otherwise this is rather similar to the 
libertarianism-model. The coefficients of the service classes are larger than in model 1, and 
the kappa value is increased by 15%. This is probably for the same reasons as mentioned for 
model 5: The service classes are also the most positive to immigration and immigrants. At the 
same time, the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no longer significant.  
Finally, model 7 includes all variables. There is not much to say; most coefficients change as 
we expect them to, given the results from the other models. The kappa value is reduced by 
11%. 
Table 4.14: The kappa values from the Conservative voting models 
  
Kappa 
Absolute 
change 
Relative 
change 
Model 1 0,35 - - 
Model 2 0,23 -0,12 -34 % 
Model 3 0,36 0,01 2 % 
Model 4 0,36 0,01 2 % 
Model 5 0,39 0,04 10 % 
Model 6 0,40 0,05 15 % 
Model 7 0,31 -0,04 -11 % 
 
To visualize these results, figure 4.14 displays the predicted probabilities of voting 
Conservative from model 1, by class. Figure 4.15 displays the predicted probabilities from 
model 7, by class and economic ideology. We note the huge impact of economic ideology on 
Conservative voting, and also how it accounts for class differences, in line with hypothesis 
4.7.1. 
 
[Figure 4.14 here] 
 
[Figure 4.15 here] 
 
 
81 
 
Figure 4.14: Predicted probabilities of voting Conservative, by class 
 
Figure 4.15: Predicted probabilities of voting Conservative, by class and economic ideology 
 
 
4.8 Value orientations and Radical Right class voting 
In section 3.8, we mentioned that the workers – the “losers” of globalization – are against 
immigration both due to the economic competition they face from immigrants and due to 
cognitive differences related to education. This last point also affects their authoritarian 
values. The service classes were thought to be at the opposite pole, as “winners” of 
globalization. For the petite bourgeoisie, the rural conservatism was mentioned as well. We 
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emphasized the post-materialist status of the RR party family. From the discussion in section 
3.8, we may develop the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.8.1: The Old Politics value orientations will not be accounting for total RR class 
voting 
Hypothesis 4.8.2: The authoritarianism-libertarianism value orientation will account for 
some total RR class voting 
Hypothesis 4.8.3: Immigration orientations will account for some total RR class voting 
The findings are reported in table 4.15. The first, bivariate model confirms what we found in 
section 3.8: The Radical Right is most popular with the two working classes and the petite 
bourgeoisie. Although the ranking is the same, there are in fact no significant differences 
between these three groups. The routine non-manual employees cover the middle ground, 
whereas the service classes are not prone to vote RR. Total Radical Right class voting is 
strong: The kappa value from model 1 is 0.43 – somewhat higher than the 0.36 we found in 
section 3.9. 
[Table 4.15 here] 
Model 2 shows that being left-wing in economic issues is negatively associated with RR 
voting. There is also some support for hypothesis 4.8.1: The coefficients are somewhat higher, 
the kappa value is increased by 8% (confer table 4.14). This implies that economic ideology 
was masking some class differences. We note that, for instance, the absolute value of the 
coefficient of the petite bourgeoisie is doubled and significant at the 5%-level
37
; the service 
classes are also more different from the unskilled workers in this model. 
Model 3 controls for religiosity. Religiosity, somewhat surprisingly, is negatively (although 
weakly) associated with RR voting. However, it does not account for any class voting: The 
coefficients and the kappa value are stable. Thus, we may conclude that hypothesis 4.8.1 is 
supported: None of the values associated with Old Politics account for class voting. The same 
is true for environmental values (model 4): It is weakly, negatively associated with RR voting, 
but does not affect class voting. 
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 It is only significant in one of the four alternative specifications. 
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Table 4.15: Radical Right voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
        
Higher -0.96
***
 -1.13
***
 -0.99
***
 -0.96
***
 -0.88
***
 -0.45
***
 -0.63
***
 
service class (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
        
Lower -0.82
***
 -0.91
***
 -0.84
***
 -0.81
***
 -0.75
***
 -0.39
**
 -0.49
***
 
service class (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Routine -0.46
***
 -0.49
***
 -0.46
***
 -0.45
***
 -0.41
***
 -0.16 -0.17 
non-manuals
38
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
        
Petite -0.16 -0.33
*
 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.29 
bourgeoisie (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
        
Skilled 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25
*
 0.27
*
 0.21 
workers (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
        
Unskilled 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
workers (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
        
Economic  -0.17
***
     -0.11
***
 
ideology  (0.02)     (0.02) 
        
Religiosity   -0.05
***
    -0.05
***
 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
        
Environmental    -0.05
*
   -0.04 
values    (0.02)   (0.02) 
        
Libertarianism     -0.07
***
  0.04 
     (0.02)  (0.02) 
        
Immigration      -0.51
***
 -0.51
***
 
attitudes      (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Intercept -2.22
***
 -2.18
***
 -2.21
***
 -2.22
***
 -2.27
***
 -2.85
***
 -2.80
***
 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
        
Intercept 0.928 0.892 0.916 0.929 1.01 0.974 0.882 
variance (0.388) (0.373) (0.383) (0.388) (0.421) (0.429) (0.369) 
N 11266 11266 11266 11266 11266 11266 11266 
 
Table 4.16: The kappa values from the Radical Right voting models 
  Kappa Absolute change Relative change 
Model 1 0,43 - - 
Model 2 0,46 0,04 8 % 
Model 3 0,43 0,00 1 % 
Model 4 0,43 0,00 -1 % 
Model 5 0,40 -0,03 -6 % 
Model 6 0,24 -0,19 -44 % 
Model 7 0,28 -0,14 -34 % 
 
                                                 
38
 In the robust logit specification, the coefficient of the routine non-manual employees is not significant. 
Nevertheless, they are similar to the results displayed here in all the gllamm-models. 
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The fifth model includes libertarianism. As expected, libertarians are less likely to vote RR 
than authoritarians. However, its effects on class voting are somewhat peculiar. First of all, it 
is reducing class voting by 6%, which is less than might be expected. This is notably due to 
the service classes becoming slightly more similar to the unskilled workers. At the same time, 
the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers becomes significant at the 5%-level 
due to a very small positive change in its magnitude.
39
 The evidence is not clear on hypothesis 
4.8.2.  
On the contrary, hypothesis 4.8.3 is very strongly supported by model 6, which includes 
attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. Controlling for these attitudes almost halves 
the total RR class voting. The difference between the higher service class and the unskilled 
workers is reduced by a third; the one between the lower service class and the unskilled 
workers is halved and significant at a less stringent level. The difference between the routine 
non-manual employees and the unskilled workers is more than halved, and no longer 
significant even at the 5%-level (while it used to be significant at the 0.1%-level). The only 
difference increasing slightly is that of the skilled workers, showing that some of the 
difference between these and the unskilled ones was masked by immigration orientations.
40
  
The final model includes all covariates. This model looks like the others, with a few 
exceptions. First, libertarianism and environmental values are no longer significantly affecting 
total RR voting. Second, the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no longer 
significant.
41
 Also, the reduction in the kappa value is 34% instead of 44%. 
[Figure 4.16 here] 
Figure 4.16 shows the predicted probabilities of RR voting by class, from model 1. As we see, 
the skilled workers have a three times higher chance of voting RR than the higher service 
class. 
[Figure 4.17 here] 
 
                                                 
39
 Although this only holds in one of the four alternative specifications. 
40
 Even more coefficients were rendered non-significant in three of the alternative specifications.  
41
 In addition, the higher service class coefficient is not significant in the robust logit model. The lower service 
class coefficient is not significant in the robust logit and one of the gllamm models. 
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Figure 4.16: Predicted probability of voting Radical Right, by class 
 
Figure 4.17: Predicted probability of voting Radical Right, by class and immigration 
orientations 
 
Figure 4.17, on the other hand, visualizes the results from model 7, by class and immigration 
orientations. We note the huge impact of immigration orientations on RR voting, and the 
reduction in class voting. Amongst the most sceptical to immigration, the skilled workers are 
only 65% more likely to vote RR than the higher service class, compared to the mentioned 
300% in model 1. At the four most immigrant-friendly values of the spectre, the absolute 
differences are negligible, and the relative ones are also much lower: The skilled workers are 
23% more likely to vote RR than the higher service class at the most immigration friendly 
part of the scale. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary: Total party family specific class voting in Western Europe 
Table 5.1 displays a summary of how much the kappa values were reduced for each party 
family by each value dimension. As we see, economic ideology was clearly most important in 
explaining class differences, reducing the kappa values by 20% on average. We also note that 
this effect varies quite a lot between the party families: Economic ideology accounts for half 
the total LS class voting; a third of the total Conservative class voting; a fifth of total Liberal, 
SD, and CD class voting; about a tenth of total Agrarian and RR class voting; and none of the 
total Green class voting. Religiosity, on the other hand, accounts for almost no class 
differences at all. Environmental values account for some total Green class voting, but are 
otherwise not important.  
Table 5.1: Summary of the reductions in total party family specific class voting 
Kappa 
reductions, % 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Economic 
ideology 
Religiosity 
Environmental 
values 
Libertarianism 
Immigration 
orientations 
Full model 
Left Socialism -50 -2 -1 -6 0 -37 
Green 2 -1 -10 -20 -21 -36 
Social 
Democracy 
-20 0 0 1 10 -13 
Agrarian -11 -2 -3 -4 2 -18 
Christian 
Democrats 
-19 3 3 12 1 3 
Liberals -20 -1 0 -2 -4 -30 
Conservatives -34 2 2 10 15 -11 
Radical Right -8 1 1 6 -44 -34 
Mean -20 0 -1 0 -5 -22 
 
Libertarianism has a mean kappa reduction of zero. Unlike religiosity, this is not because it is 
unimportant in accounting for class differences, but rather because it in some cases accounts 
for class differences, while in others it is masking class differences. We note especially that 
libertarianism explains a fifth of the total Green class voting. It also accounts for six percent 
of total LS class voting and four percent of total Agrarian class voting. The class voting 
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increased for the CD, Conservative, and RR party families – by 12, 10 and 6 percent, 
respectively. 
Immigration orientations give perhaps the clearest example of a value orientation that has 
different impact on total class voting for different party families. It accounts for almost half of 
total RR class voting, and a fifth of total Green class voting. At the same time, it is increasing 
total Conservative class voting by 15 percent, and total SD class voting by 10. It has no 
notable impact on total LS, Agrarian, or CD class voting. 
Direct party family specific class voting (model 7) is 22% lower than total party family 
specific class voting. Direct class voting is strongly reduced compared to total class voting for 
four party families: The Left Socialists, the Green parties, the Radical Right, and the Liberals. 
For these four, direct class voting is more than 30% lower than total class voting. It is very 
interesting to note that three of these four party families (the LS, the Green, and the RR) are 
connected to New Politics. 
Direct SD and Conservative class voting are reduced by 13 and 11%, respectively. Direct CD 
class voting is barely affected compared to total CD class voting. This is because controlling 
for economic ideology reduces direct class voting, while including the other value orientations 
(especially libertarianism) increases class differences. 
In sum, it is clear that the value orientations account for different amounts of total party 
family specific class voting, and that these effects vary from party family to party family. It is 
also clear that the five value orientations do not account for all of the bivariate association 
between class and voting. Future research in this area might wish to include variables related 
to other possible mechanisms, like the role of objective class interests or the social networks 
members of a class are embedded in. 
5.2 Conclusion: The Future of the Fourth Generation  
After criticizing the formerly used inadequate class dichotomy between manual and non-
manual classes, Evans (2010: 636) writes that 
 “[o]f even more concern is the minimalist version of political choice – left versus non-left – 
used in research across systems with varying dimensionality, and the obscuring of ‘New 
Right’ or ‘New Left’ bases of vote in unhelpfully aggregated categories.”  
In this thesis, we have emphasized the critique of the dichotomous left-right party choice 
variable commonly applied in the class voting literature. Rather than paying lip service to this 
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critique and then following up with pooled analyses employing the dichotomous left-right 
party choice variable anyway, we have consistently used a fourth generation dependent 
variable in our comparative analysis, measuring total class voting. We have seen that there are 
indeed considerable differences in the class bases of the party families that normally would 
have been forced into the “Left” or “Right” categories. This means that former analyses that 
have employed the old party choice variable will benefit from being replicated with a proper 
measurement of party choice. In addition, the class bases discovered might have been even 
more consistent if we used a class schema that recognizes the divisions within the service 
classes (see Evans and de Graaf 2013b: 402). It would indeed be interesting to replicate this 
study with the class schema of Oesch (2006), and compare the findings. 
Furthermore, we have seen that about a fifth of the total party family specific class voting was 
accounted for by five central value orientations, with economic left-right ideology as the most 
important one. The attempt to test the mechanisms through which social class has its effects 
on voting was fruitful; and as Evans (2010: 637) strongly advocated, future research should 
pay more attention to this aspect of the association between structure and vote. In this line of 
research, it is equally important to keep the fourth generation dependent variable. As we have 
shown, the value orientations account for different amounts of total class voting for the 
different party families. The whole value orientation model accounts for almost 40% of the 
bivariate association between social class and Left Socialist voting, but it accounts for none of 
the class differences in Christian Democratic voting. 
The history of the study of class voting is a history of ever more nuanced analyses and 
measures, yielding ever more valid conclusions. Throughout the last decades, the scholars 
have gone from absolute to relative measures of class voting. We are no longer using the 
over-simplistic division between manual and non-manual occupations; we now have complex 
class schemas developed for post-industrial societies at our disposal. It is about time that we 
also stop using the over-simplistic division between left and right parties. The fourth 
generation is here to stay. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Variable operationalization 
The operationalization of social class is thoroughly discussed in chapter 2, thus it is not 
repeated here.  
A.1.1 The coding of parties into the party family variable (original name in italics) 
Communist parties 
Austria: Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs) 
Denmark: Red-Green Alliance/Unity List (Enhetslisten) 
France: French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français) 
Greece: Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommounistikó 
Kómma Elládas) 
Italy: Communist Refoundation Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista) and 
Communist Workers’ Party (Partido Comunista del Lavoratori) 
Luxembourg: Communist Party (Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg) 
Norway: Red (Rødt) 
Portugal: Democratic Unity Coalition (PCP/PEV)
42
 
Switzerland: Labour Party (Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz) 
Socialist Left parties 
Denmark: Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) 
Finland: Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) 
France: Left Wing Extremist parties
43
 
Germany: Left party (die Linke) 
Greece: Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) 
Iceland: Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð) 
Ireland: Sinn Féin 
Italy: Left and Freedom party 
Luxembourg: Left party (Déi Lénk) 
Netherlands: Socialist party (Socialistische Partij) 
Norway: Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk venstreparti) 
Portugal: Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) 
Spain: United Left (Izquierda Unida) 
Sweden: Left Party (Vänstern) 
                                                 
42
 The Democratic Unity Coalition is an electoral and political coalition between the Portuguese Communist 
Party (PCP) and the Ecologist Party "The Greens" (PEV). Since the Communist Party is the major force inside 
the coalition, the coalition is grouped as a communist party. 
43
 Revolutionary Communist League, Workers' Struggle and Workers' Party 
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Green parties 
Austria: Green party (die Grünen) 
Belgium: Green party (Groen, Ecolo)
44
 
Finland: Green League (Vihreä liitto) 
France: Green party (les Verts) and other environmental parties 
Sweden: Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna)  
Germany: Greens (die Grünen) 
Ireland: Green Party 
Luxembourg: Greens (Déi Gréng) 
Netherlands: GreenLeft (GroenLinks) 
Switzerland: Green party (Grüne Partei der Schweiz) and Green Liberal party (Grünliberale 
Partei der Schweiz) 
UK: Green Party 
Social Democratic parties 
Austria: Austrian Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) 
Belgium: Socialist parties (SP.A-Spirit
45
 and Parti Socialiste) 
Denmark: Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) 
Finland: Social Democratic Party of Finland (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) 
France: Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) 
Germany: German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
Greece: Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) 
Iceland: Alliance party (Samfylkingin-Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands) 
Italy: Democratic party (Partito Democratico) 
Luxembourg: Socialist party (Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei) 
Netherlands: Labour party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) 
Norway: Labour party (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Portugal: Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) 
Spain: Socialist Workers’ Party (Parti Socialista Obrero Español) 
Sweden: Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) 
Switzerland: Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz) 
Ethnic/Regional parties 
Belgium: New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA) 
Finland: Swedish People’s Party (Svenska folkpartiet) 
Italy: Lega Nord 
Spain: Convergence and Unity (Convergència i Unió, CiU), Republican Left of Catalonia 
                                                 
44
 For Belgium, there will usually be both a Flemish and a Walloon party within the party families  
45
 SP.a-SPIRIT is a Belgian electoral coalition between the Flemish parties Socialist Party Different (SP.a) and 
Spirit. 
98 
 
(Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC), Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi 
Jeltzalea, PNV), and other regional parties . 
Agrarian parties 
Denmark: Agrarian Liberals (Venstre) 
Finland: Centre party (Suomen Keskusta) 
Iceland: Progress party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) 
Norway: Centre party (Senterpartiet) 
Sweden: Centre party (Centerpartiet) 
Liberal parties 
Austria: Liberal Forum (Liberales Forum, LiF) 
Belgium: Liberal parties (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten, VLD, and Mouvement 
Réformateur, MR) 
Denmark: Radical Liberals (Radikale Venstre) 
Germany: Free Democratic party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) 
France: Democratic Movement (Mouvement démocrate) and New Centrist party (Nouveau 
Centre) 
Luxembourg: Democratic party (Demokratesch Partei) 
Netherlands: People’s party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie, VVD) 
Norway: Liberal party (Venstre) 
Portugal: Social Democratic party (Partido Social Democrata, PPD/PSD) 
Sweden: Liberal party (Folkpartiet liberalerne) 
Switzerland: Radical party and Liberal party 
UK: Liberal Democrats 
 
Christian Democratic parties 
Austria: Austrian People’s party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) 
Belgium: Christian parties (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, CD&V, and Centre démocrate 
humaniste, CDH) 
Finland: Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit) 
Germany: CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and CSU (Christlich-Soziale 
Union in Bayern) 
Ireland: Fine Gail 
Italy: Union of the Centre (Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro) 
Luxembourg: Social Christian party (Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei) 
Netherlands: Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl) 
Norway: Christian People’s party (Kristelig Folkeparti) 
Sweden: Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) 
Switzerland: Christian Democratic Peoples’ party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der 
Schweiz) 
99 
 
Conservative parties 
Denmark: Conservative People’s party (Det Konservative Folkeparti) 
Finland: National Coalition party (Kansallinen Kokoomus) 
France: Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) 
Greece: New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) 
Iceland: Independence party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) 
Ireland: Fianna Fail 
Italy: People of Freedom (Il Popolo della Libertà) 
Norway: Conservative party (Høyre) 
Portugal: Popular party (Partido Popular) 
Spain: Popular party (Partido Popular) 
Sweden: Conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet) 
UK: Conservative party 
Radical Right parties 
Austria: Freedom party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) and Alliance for the Future of 
Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich) 
Belgium: Vlaams Belang and Front National 
Denmark: Danish People’s party (Dansk Folkeparti) 
Finland: True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) 
France: Front National and National Republican Movement (Mouvement National 
Républicain) 
Germany: Republican party (Die Republikaner), National Democratic party 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion) 
Greece: Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) 
Italy: Tricolour Flame 
Luxembourg: Alternative Democratic Reform party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei) 
Netherland: Freedom party (Partij voor de Vrijheid) 
Norway: Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet) 
Switzerland: Swiss People’s party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) 
Other parties 
Iceland: Citizen movement (Borgarahreyfingin) 
Belgium: Lijst Dedecker 
France: Minor left-wing parties; Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and Tradition (Chasse, Pêche, 
Nature, Traditions); Movement for France (Mouvement pour la France) 
Ireland: Independents 
Italy: Italy of Values (Italia del Valori) 
Netherlands: D66, Christian Union, SGP Reformed party, Party for the Animals (Partij voor 
de Dieren), and Group Verdonk 
 
A.1.2 The construction of the value orientation indexes 
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The value orientations are constructed the exact same way as in Knutsen (2012). The 
following is based on Knutsen (2012: 27-31). 
Religious/secular values  
(Q30) Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?  
a) God, b) Life after death, c) Hell, d) Heaven, e) Sin (V119-V123)  
An index from 0-5 is constructed based on the number of beliefs the respondents hold.  
V129 (Q36) How important is God in your life? (1-10)  
This scale is transformed (not collapsed) to a scale with values from 0 to 5, and then added to 
the scale for religious beliefs. The final index is then an equal-weighted additive index 
between the two components, religious beliefs and importance of God with values from 0 to 
10. A high score on the index indicates a religious orientation; a low score indicates a secular 
orientation. 
Economic left-right values  
The index is based on the following variables in the dataset and the question number in the 
questionnaire:  
V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility  
V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control  
V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives  
V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership  
V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful  
The variables were tapped by a question battery where the respondents were shown a card 
with two opposite statements located to the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question 
was formulated as follows: “On this card you see a number of opposite views on various 
issues. How would you place your views on this scale?” 
V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility 
“Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves” versus “The state 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”.  
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V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control 
 “The state should give more freedom to firms” versus “The state should control firms more 
effectively”. 
V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives 
“Incomes should be made more equal” versus “There should be greater incentives for 
individual effort”. 
V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership 
“Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” versus “government 
ownership of business and industry should be increased”. 
V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful 
“Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” versus 
“Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people” 
 
Environmental values  
The index is based on the questions in Q85 (V295-301). 
“I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, 
can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?“ 
V295: I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution  
V296: We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support  
V297: When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences  
V298: Human ingenuity will insure that the earth remains fit to live in  
V299: The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations  
V300: Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature  
V301: If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe  
All items are then based on four-point Likert item (“Agree strongly”, “Agree”, “Disagree” 
and “Disagree strongly”. The neutral alternative “Neither agree nor disagree” was not 
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included. The index is an equal-weighted additive index (0-10) where support for 
environmental values has the highest values. 
Q85C/V297 was not asked in the Swedish population. As such, they had missing values on 
this variable and have all been given the value 5.5. This ensured that we could keep all the 
indicators for the rest of the 17 countries. However, to make sure that this did not affect the 
findings, we created a new environmental values variable which excluded v297 and hence all 
the Swedish respondents had proper values on this variable. We then ran all the analyses in 
this thesis again. No results were changed substantially. Almost all coefficients remained the 
same, and the few that did change were changed by a magnitude of 0.01-0.03.  
Libertarian-authoritarian values  
These orientations are tapped by several personal values that are found in different questions 
and value batteries. Below the questions for the various items are outlined. The values or 
response alternatives that tap libertarian and authoritarian values are indicated with (lib.) or 
(auth.) respectively.  
V101 (Q20) Follow instructions  
People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one should 
follow instructions of one’s superiors even when one does not fully agree with them. Others 
say that one should follow one’s superiors’ instructions only when one is convinced that they 
are right. Which of these two opinions do you agree with?  
1 – Should follow instructions (auth.)  
2 – Must be convinced first (lib.)  
3 – Depends  
8 – Don’t know (spontaneous)  
9 – No answer (spontaneous)  
V167 (Q49) Love parents  
Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with?  
A: Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and 
respect them;  
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B: One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their 
behaviour and attitudes  
1 – Tend to agree with statement A (auth.)  
2 – Tend to agree with statement B (lib.)  
8 – Don’t know (spontaneous)  
9 – No answer (spontaneous)  
V204 (Q62) Greater respect for authority  
Q62 Here are two changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please 
tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad 
thing, or don’t you mind?  
Greater respect for authority 
1 – good 
2 – bad 
3 – don’t mind 
8 – don’t know 
9 – no answer  
Q52: Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!  
INTERVIEWER: CODE NOT MORE THAN FIVE!  
V170 A Good manners (auth.) 1 2 8 9  
V171 B Independence (lib.) 1 2 8 9  
V172 C Hard work (auth.) 1 2 8 9  
V173 D Feeling of responsibility 1 2 8 9  
V174 E Imagination (lib.) 1 2 8 9  
V175 F Tolerance and respect for other people 1 2 8 9  
V176 G Thrift, saving money and things 1 2 8 9  
V177 H Determination, perseverance 1 2 8 9  
V178 I Religious faith 1 2 8 9  
V179 J Unselfishness 1 2 8 9  
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V180 K Obedience (auth.) 1 2 8 9  
V181 None (spontaneous) 1 2 8 9  
1 – mentioned 
2 – not mentioned 
3 – don’t know 
4 – no answer  
Only those item that are in italics are used to tap the libertarian-authoritarian dimension.  
The index was constructed as an equal-weighted index with value from 0 to 10. A high score 
on the index indicates a libertarian orientation.  
Immigration orientations 
These orientations are tapped by six questions which are asked in a battery where the 
respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located at the endpoints of a 
scale from 1 to 10. The questions were formulated as follows:  
Q78: “Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views 
on this scale? (from 1 to 10) “ 
A (V268): Take jobs 
“Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country” versus “immigrants do not take jobs 
away from natives in a country”  
B (V269): Cultural life undermined 
“A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants” versus “a country’s cultural life is 
not undermined by immigrants” 
C (V270): Crime problems 
“Immigrants make crime problems worse” versus “immigrants do not make crime problems 
worse”  
D (V271): Welfare 
“Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system” versus “immigrants are not a strain 
on a country’s welfare system”  
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E (V272): Threat to society 
“In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society” versus “in the 
future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society”  
F (V273): Customs and traditions 
“For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and 
traditions” versus “for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain 
their distinct customs and traditions, but adopt the customs of the country”  
An equal-weighted additive index was constructed on the basis of these six items. The index 
has values from 0 to 10, and a high score indicates a non-restrictive view on immigration and 
a positive view on immigrants. 
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are for all units that are included in the analyses in this thesis, i.e. 
excluding those that have missing values on the party family or social class variable. 
A.2.1: Social class 
Table A.1: Social class in percent, by country 
  Hi serv. Lo serv. Rout nman Petite bourg. Skilled work. Unskilled work N 
Austria 13,5 18,9 30,0 9,3 12,2 16,0 813 
Belgium 15,2 30,0 16,1 6,6 12,4 19,9 1068 
Denmark 20,3 26,5 20,4 6,6 10,4 15,7 1190 
Finland 25,7 26,2 22,6 7,9 7,6 10,0 738 
France 15,9 28,5 20,2 6,5 11,6 17,3 1059 
Germany 12,3 18,6 24,5 5,0 21,8 17,8 1244 
Greece 10,4 13,9 15,6 35,6 8,8 15,8 800 
Iceland 17,3 32,3 16,9 11,1 9,8 12,8 533 
Ireland 8,9 19,9 30,0 7,5 11,7 22,0 583 
Italy 13,5 24,5 17,8 16,2 11,4 16,5 702 
Luxembourg 15,3 28,1 22,0 5,9 11,0 17,7 745 
Netherlands 21,4 30,0 21,6 7,9 7,6 11,5 1267 
Norway 20,7 25,7 24,9 7,7 8,7 12,2 942 
Portugal 4,9 11,1 22,5 9,2 18,8 33,6 596 
Spain 7,8 12,0 26,3 11,8 12,8 29,3 782 
Sweden 15,5 33,0 25,3 5,7 8,7 11,8 858 
Switzerland 22,1 31,1 23,1 5,4 9,7 8,6 698 
Great Britain 20,0 25,7 20,7 7,4 8,8 17,3 1022 
Total 16,0 24,6 22,1 9,2 11,4 16,7 15640 
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A.2.2: The party families 
Table A.2: Support for the party families in percent, by country 
  Communist LS Green SD Etnreg Agrarian Liberals CD Cons. RR Other N 
Austria 1,6  
14,8 32,5 
  
3,6 23,9 
 
21,0 2,7 813 
Belgium   
14,4 25,3 7,2 
 
17,3 24,3 
 
6,1 5,4 1068 
Denmark 1,8 20,4  
22,8 
 
29,7 6,7 
 
8,3 8,7 1,4 1190 
Finland  
5,8 16,1 18,3 1,8 14,0 
 
3,0 26,7 12,5 1,9 738 
France 3,9 5,9 10,2 28,7   
14,3 
 
22,5 3,0 11,5 1059 
Germany  
19,0 10,0 22,9 
  
9,1 33,6 0,0 3,5 1,9 1244 
Greece 7,6 9,1  
33,6 
   
0,0 32,0 4,0 13,6 800 
Iceland 0,0 20,6  
25,7 
 
12,9 
 
0,0 29,3 
 
11,4 533 
Ireland  
8,9 5,0 8,9 
   
22,8 41,5 
 
12,9 583 
Italy 6,3 3,1 2,1 32,9 8,4   
9,4 25,4 2,3 10,1 702 
Luxembourg 2,7 2,0 17,2 24,7   
19,1 26,3 
 
3,5 4,6 745 
Netherlands  
11,0 5,9 16,2 
  
14,3 24,5 
 
2,8 25,3 1267 
Norway 2,1 7,0  
29,1 
 
7,9 6,2 5,2 18,2 22,6 1,8 942 
Portugal 11,2 5,0  
40,3 
  
32,7 
 
2,2 
 
8,6 596 
Spain  
8,2 
 
48,8 5,5 
   
30,4 
 
7,0 782 
Sweden  
7,7 9,1 29,6 
 
4,4 8,9 4,0 28,4 
 
7,9 858 
Switzerland 2,6  
14,2 20,9 
  
19,2 12,8 
 
22,1 8,3 698 
Great Britain   
8,3 29,4 2,2 
 
15,0 
 
38,2 
 
7,0 1022 
Total 2,0 7,8 7,3 26,9 1,4 4,1 9,6 11,3 15,5 6,3 8,0 15640 
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A.2.3: The value orientations 
Table A.3: Economic ideology, from right (0) to left (10) 
  Mean SD Min Max N 
Austria 4,54 1,56 0,00 9,56 813 
Belgium 4,52 1,53 0,00 10,00 1068 
Denmark 3,77 1,63 0,00 10,00 1190 
Finland 4,68 1,82 0,00 10,00 738 
France 4,60 1,71 0,00 10,00 1059 
Germany 4,48 1,67 0,00 9,33 1244 
Greece 5,13 1,78 0,00 10,00 800 
Iceland 4,07 1,65 0,00 9,56 533 
Ireland 4,04 1,40 0,00 8,44 583 
Italy 4,54 1,71 0,00 9,11 702 
Luxembourg 4,32 1,49 0,00 10,00 745 
Netherlands 4,29 1,40 0,00 9,11 1267 
Norway 3,93 1,59 0,00 8,89 942 
Portugal 4,39 1,29 0,00 9,33 596 
Spain 5,11 1,39 0,00 10,00 782 
Sweden 4,00 1,88 0,00 10,00 858 
Switzerland 4,04 1,57 0,00 9,33 698 
UK 3,76 1,57 0,00 9,11 1022 
Total 4,33 1,65 0,00 10,00 15640 
 
Table A.4 Religiosity, from low to high 
  Mean SD Min. Max. N 
Austria 4,97 3,03 0 10 813 
Belgium 3,83 3,12 0 10 1068 
Denmark 2,97 2,59 0 10 1190 
Finland 4,30 3,32 0 10 738 
France 3,70 3,21 0 10 1059 
Germany 3,42 3,31 0 10 1244 
Greece 6,81 2,67 0 10 800 
Iceland 5,09 2,94 0 10 533 
Ireland 6,93 2,75 0 10 583 
Italy 6,08 3,13 0 10 702 
Luxembourg 4,20 3,03 0 10 745 
Netherlands 4,25 3,36 0 10 1267 
Norway 3,51 3,22 0 10 942 
Portugal 6,18 2,63 0 10 596 
Spain 4,60 3,14 0 10 782 
Sweden 2,76 2,98 0 10 858 
Switzerland 4,82 2,98 0 10 698 
UK 4,79 3,45 0 10 1022 
Total 4,43 3,29 0 10 15640 
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Table A.5: Environmentalism, from low to high 
  Mean SD Min. max N 
Austria 6,27 1,59 1,07 10,00 813 
Belgium 6,14 1,57 0,00 10,00 1068 
Denmark 6,16 1,49 0,36 10,00 1190 
Finland 6,69 1,67 1,43 10,00 738 
France 6,60 1,49 1,43 10,00 1059 
Germany 6,02 1,64 0,71 10,00 1244 
Greece 7,20 1,31 2,50 10,00 800 
Iceland 5,46 1,49 0,71 9,64 533 
Ireland 5,63 1,56 1,07 10,00 583 
Italy 6,30 1,35 1,79 10,00 702 
Luxembourg 6,67 1,42 1,43 10,00 745 
Netherlands 5,61 1,33 1,43 9,64 1267 
Norway 5,92 1,66 0,71 10,00 942 
Portugal 6,21 1,43 2,14 9,64 596 
Spain 6,35 1,49 1,79 10,00 782 
Sweden 5,50 0,00 5,50 5,50 858 
Switzerland 6,69 1,46 0,36 10,00 698 
UK 5,94 1,50 1,07 9,64 1022 
Total 6,17 1,53 0,00 10,00 15640 
 
Table A.6: Authoritarianism (low) – libertarianism (high) 
  Mean SD Min. Max. N 
Austria 5,46 1,93 0,00 10,00 813 
Belgium 3,72 2,02 0,00 10,00 1068 
Denmark 5,66 1,86 0,00 10,00 1190 
Finland 5,41 1,80 0,00 10,00 738 
France 3,86 2,08 0,00 10,00 1059 
Germany 5,20 1,94 0,00 10,00 1244 
Greece 4,12 1,82 0,00 10,00 800 
Iceland 4,87 1,90 0,00 10,00 533 
Ireland 4,16 1,74 0,00 8,75 583 
Italy 3,80 1,83 0,00 10,00 702 
Luxembourg 4,07 1,95 0,00 10,00 745 
Netherlands 4,57 1,90 0,00 10,00 1267 
Norway 5,81 1,75 1,25 10,00 942 
Portugal 3,26 1,59 0,00 8,75 596 
Spain 4,15 1,84 0,00 10,00 782 
Sweden 6,04 1,94 0,63 10,00 858 
Switzerland 5,06 1,97 0,00 10,00 698 
UK 3,87 1,83 0,00 9,38 1022 
Total 4,66 2,05 0,00 10,00 15640 
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Table A.7: Immigration values, from negative to positive 
  Mean SD Min. Max. N 
Austria 3,79 2,36 0,00 10,00 813 
Belgium 3,93 2,11 0,00 10,00 1068 
Denmark 4,97 2,00 0,00 10,00 1190 
Finland 4,85 2,30 0,00 10,00 738 
France 5,15 2,26 0,00 10,00 1059 
Germany 3,91 1,91 0,00 10,00 1244 
Greece 4,16 2,18 0,00 10,00 800 
Iceland 5,21 2,00 0,19 10,00 533 
Ireland 3,99 1,95 0,00 10,00 583 
Italy 4,87 2,31 0,00 10,00 702 
Luxembourg 5,16 2,10 0,00 10,00 745 
Netherlands 4,62 1,85 0,00 10,00 1267 
Norway 4,45 1,90 0,00 10,00 942 
Portugal 5,00 1,62 0,74 10,00 596 
Spain 4,81 1,87 0,00 10,00 782 
Sweden 5,16 2,51 0,00 10,00 858 
Switzerland 4,51 2,01 0,00 9,81 698 
UK 3,63 2,19 0,00 10,00 1022 
Total 4,53 2,15 0,00 10,00 15640 
 
A.3 Abbreviations 
CD: Christian Democratic/Christian Democracy 
LS: Left Socialist/Left Socialism 
RR: Radical Right 
SD: Social Democratic/Social Democrats/Social Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
